Adjusting to the Senate: The Problem of Governing

I have noted that in the summer and fall of 1978, I had spent some time, off and on, watching seven campaigns for the United States Senate. I also noted that in the winter and spring of 1979, I had spent some time, off and on, watching the five winners of those campaigns as they worked in the Senate. The campaign watching took place out in the country; the Senate watching took place in Washington. From each of these two periods and contexts, I have drawn a set of observations. One set was presented on Tuesday and the other set will be presented today. As I said on Tuesday, the ultimate objectives of this research are to understand the Senate and to understand Senate-House relations in the American system of bicameralism. But I present the observations now without any clear idea as to how they might serve these longer range purposes. I hope they will provide useful building blocks. I think they will. But I want to begin today on the same note of caution I sounded on Tuesday. I am discussing first observations and possible building blocks, not a completed or even an
envisioned corpus of research.

In this same vein, I began with no preconceived ideas about how, if at all, my observations about campaigning might relate to my observations about behavior in the Senate. Having begun the research, however, the question of linkage between these two sets of observations naturally presents itself. And one potentially useful answer did grow out of Tuesday's look at campaigning. The linking idea is that of the Senate's six-year cycle—during one part of which senators regularly accent campaigning activity and during another part of which senators regularly accent something else. Just what this something else might be remains vague. On Tuesday, I referred to it, very imaginatively, as non-campaign activity. It is hard to be much more precise. But we could put a positive face on this something else if we thought of it, provisionally anyway, as the activity of governing.

As I say, I cannot be precise about what governing means. I assume it has something to do with a senator's legislative work, his participation in

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policy making, and his contribution to running the country. I also assume that while it is certainly not unrelated, it is different from the activity involved in winning elections. Winning and governing are, at some level of analysis, distinguishable political processes. The distinction is, of course, a staple of current commentary on the Carter Presidency. "You wooed us with words of love" wrote one Carter critic, "but now we find you are impotent." "The problem with you people," Tip O'Neill lectures Hamilton Jordan, "is that you've run an election campaign for governor and an election campaign for President, but you've never run a reelection campaign. You lose people by governing, by making hard decisions and you have to pick up new support..." "Where (things) went wrong," wrote James Flansburg in the Des Moines Register, "is that the Carter people weren't as interested in the nuts and bolts of governing and learning how to do it in Washington as they were in the nuts and bolts of winning an election."

If there is a difference between the activities of winning and those of governing, then the longer the electoral cycle of the officials involved, the easier should be the analysis of those differences. It was only after
two years of a four-year cycle that the "can win-can't govern" description of Jimmy Carter developed. With House members, the cycle is too short. With senators, the analysis of patterns should be easiest. Such, at least, is our working assumption.

It should be easier still because every Senate is equally divided into three classes—according to their proximity to election—hence, according to their relative preoccupation with governing and winning. The idea of the cycle can tell us when to look at which senators and what kind of behavior to expect to see. On Tuesday, we closed our discussion of campaigning—of winning if you will—by suggesting that senators in their last two years move with regularity from an emphasis on something else to an emphasis on campaigning. As a key transition point, the fifth year and the activity of some senator in that year deserves special attention. Today, I want to look at another group of senators at the opposite end of the electoral cycle—on the first years in the Senate. Here is another important transition point—as certain senators move regularly from an emphasis on winning to an emphasis on governing. This transition will be
less sharp and less notable for reelected incumbents than for newly elected freshmen. Three of the winners whose campaigns I watched became first-termers and I followed them to Washington early in 1979 to observe and talk about their adjustments.

The presence of three newcomers to my stable of senators was not fortuitous. In choosing campaigns to follow, I had deliberately selected three people who had served in the House of Representatives and who were reaching for the Senate. I did so, because, if they won, I thought they could help me make comparisons between the two chambers. I did not choose them because they would be on the front-end of an electoral cycle. That idea had not occurred to me. The idea of the cycle came to me, as I said earlier, only after I had observed and reflected on several campaigns.

The three young men who had been members of the House and who are now senators were: Bill Cohen, 38 y/o Maine Republican and Paul Tsongas, 38 y/o Massachusetts Democrat—both of whom were members of the House; and David Pryor, 42 y/o Arkansas Democrat who was governor of his state, but
who had previously served three terms in the House. Just as I had dropped
in on their campaigns, I dropped in on their early days in the Senate. I
have not dropped in since last June; so what I have to say today pertains
roughly to their first six months on the job. And what I want to do is,
very simply, to relay some observations concerning what these three
senators are like and how they are coping individually with their
transitions from winning to governing.

To be around them after the election is to be made constantly aware of the
fact of the transition. As soon as you walk into their Washington—or
their state—offices, you see many of the same people you met on the
campaign trail. One-third of the Cohen, the Pryor and the Tsongas Senate
staffs are people who worked in their campaigns—11 of 32 in the case of
Cohen, 7 of 22 for Pryor, and 15 of 46 for Tsongas. The ease with which
some of these people are converted from congressional or gubernatorial
staffs to campaign staffs and then reconverted into senatorial staffs
demonstrates the continuities involved in the processes of winning and
governing. Though they may be, now, turning their attention more to
problems of governing, senators obviously want people around them who are fully conversant with the problems of winning, people sensitive to their continuing political problems at home, people with proven political skills and loyalties. They particularly want such people in the top administrative, legislative and public relations staff jobs—both in Washington and back in the state. These home state staffs—30% of the total for Cohen and Pryor, and nearly 50% of the total for Tsongas—are, of course, the visible ambassadors of the senator to the territories where winning always takes place. The campaign managers of four of the five senators with whom I travelled are now members of the senators’ staff—in Washington or at home.

Another sign of the transition period is that senators may still feel constrained by things said or things done during the campaign. If we wish to understand the transition, we must understand the ripple effects of the recent campaign. In October, in Stuttgart, Arkansas, the self-styled “rice capitol of the world” I had listened to David Pryor make a promise, “I hope I become a member of that committee. If I get to the Senate, I’m going to
make the point loud and clear that in all the Department of Agriculture, there's not one advocate of the rice industry..." It was a commitment to a group of his strongest supporters—the farmers of southern and eastern Arkansas. In Washington, in January, he was less than enthusiastic. "The Agriculture Committee is a shambles. There's almost a vacuum there. When I told other senators that I wanted it, they said 'too bad' or 'maybe we can reduce the size of the committee so you won't have to go on'". But he did. As his AA put it, "He's going to go on Agriculture whether he wants to or not." The first staff person he hired was an agriculture expert; and the first bill he introduced was an agriculture bill. It was the most direct, most specific kind of campaign influence on governing.

Paul Tsongas' transition was complicated by his campaign promise of accessibility—his major issue complaint against incumbent Senator Edward Brooke. Redeeming the promise meant returning to Massachusetts a great deal. But returning home often means neglecting some of the business of governing. Or, at least, it imposes impossible time binds and great physical strain. Tsongas was feeling both. "The big problem here is
time," he said in May. "The demands are much greater than in the House...in the House I tried to do everything I was asked to do, go everywhere I was invited. The problem is: how do you learn to say no. I'm doing 14 commencements this spring. Can you believe it? Part of it is my own doing. After the campaign I never stopped. I went around thanking everybody. So I never recouped from the campaign. And I haven't stopped since. The result is, I feel tried all the time." In addition to his promise of accessibility, Tsongas kept on campaigning because he felt politically insecure in his large state. "There are so many places I haven't been that I want to get established," he said during a June trip to Massachusetts. And as we drove through small towns, in the central part of the state, he would say, "This would be a good place for a town meeting. They would appreciate it. I've never been here before." Riding in the car, he leafed through a folder of thank you letters. "When you accept appearances like these and do them well," he said, "the recognition is tremendous. So the temptation is to keep it up...politically, it's fantastic; but personally, it's devastating. I can't keep up the pace," he said later. "Only two more weeks and then I'm going to spend time with my...
family."

Bill Cohen was trying to make a much more radical transition from winning to governing than Tsongas. Between January 15 and May 20, Tsongas had made 13 trips home and spent 31 days there. During the same period, Cohen went home five times and spent nine days there. Cohen was trying to put the campaign and its rhythms behind him, trying to think about adjusting to the Senate. "Nobody talks about their campaigns. It's over; you start fresh. It's the same as your being in the House. That doesn't matter over here either. It's a clean slate." Cohen was also trying to establish a clean slate with his constituents, changing their expectations as to the allocation of his time. "I set a certain standard of expectation when I was in the House, going home every weekend. But I'm not going to do that now...I need time to think. The people back home believe that you do your thinking during the week and then should get on the plane and come home for the weekend. But I can't think during the week." Cohen's concentration on governing was not, however, unrelated to his campaign. "Yesterday, I got a call from the editor of the Portland Press Herald asking me why I'm keeping
such a low profile back in Maine," he said in March. "They are going to write a criticism of me for not appearing at every bean supper back home. I've been studying hard, doing my homework, showing up on time. During the campaign, I had to confront the show horse/work horse argument. I've been trying to be a work horse. I've been down here for a month and a half without going home...pretty soon, though, I've have to start going back. If you want to mold public opinion, you have to do it back there." So, Cohen, too, remains constrained by the circumstances of his winning—by the campaign charge that he would be a media-oriented, show horse senator. Whereas Tsongas' response to events of his campaign had been to go home a lot; Cohen's response to the events of his campaign had been to stay in Washington a lot. Neither, however, had found a permanent balance.

Whatever constraints may remind them of the campaign, all three were feeling their way, in their own way, into the institution. How they perceived the Senate and how they conducted themselves as members of it depended very much on what each individual wanted out of Senate membership in the first place—his personal goal. I am much impressed by the idea
that in order to understand the behavior of legislators, we must try to understand their personal goals. And it is one of the benefits of campaign watching that legislators talk more openly and more readily about their goals in that context than they do in Washington. Thus, one of the links between Tuesdays observations and todays observations is that most of their discussion of their personal goals—which illuminates their behavior in the Senate—actually took place during the campaign. It is a kind of introspection which seems to flow easier when they are back home reaching for the Senate than when they are in Washington. The four goals most commonly espoused by American legislators are those of reelection, power inside the institution, good public policy, and election to another office. For senators, the other office is, of course, the Presidency, or the Vice Presidency. And, while none of the three is a serious candidate for these offices, senatorial status always carries that possibility. In early January, Tsongas commented on one difference between being in the House and Senate. "I was on a talk show this morning and the first question phoned in was, 'Am I interested in running for the Presidency?' Later on I spoke to the fifth grade class and got the same question. I just saw US Magazine
over there on the desk and they call me 'a presidential possibility.'

That's three references in one day. That happens to me all the time...I
know there's nothing special about me. The same thing is happening to
Bill Bradley, Max Baucus, Bill Cohen and the others." Here again, we see
the media's fascination with senators--any senators. In a paraphrase of
John Kennedy's famous line, "a rising media tide lifts all the senators."
The least known of the senators benefits from the attention showered on the
best known of the senators. If Tsongas or Cohen or Pryor ever does become
a serious presidential candidate, he will have to float himself, partly
anyway, on his performance as a senator. And so we can put aside, for now,
the "other office" goal and look at the mix of reelection, power and policy
goals each of the three brings to his first years in the Senate.

It is one assumption of the cyclical view of Senate life that senators are
less constantly concerned with their reelection than are House members. It
is not, as I have said, that they forget about it. It's just that six
years gives them more time to devote to matters of governing. Or, we might
say, more time to pursue their personal goals of power and policy.

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Perhaps, from the individuals standpoint this is what "governing" is all about—the pursuit of power in the institution and the pursuit of good public policy—as opposed to the pursuit of reelection. Not only does the Senate term provide more time to pursue these governing-related goals, but the Senate size—100 as against 435—provides more opportunity. Eighty-six House members have run for the Senate since 1962; 30 members of the present Senate were once members of the House—making up the largest Senate bloc in terms of career background. Doubtless, many of these former House members had the desire to spend more time and energy on the business of governing, wanted to be relatively more influential within the legislature or participate more in making good public policy. Such a logic would predictably appeal most to House members with relatively little accumulated House seniority. And such does appear to be the case. Of the 86 House members who ran for the Senate between 1962 and 1978, 52 of them or 60% had three terms or less when they relinquished their House seat. Cohen (with three), Tsongas (with two), and Pryor (with three) all fell in this category. Pryor tried first and failed in 1972; he was elected and reelected to the governorship before he renewed his quest for a Senate seat.
in 1978.

The clearest expression of this House-to-Senate winning-to-governing career logic came from Paul Tsongas. His goals are the most strongly policy-oriented of the three men; he more than the others sees the Senate in instrumental terms--as a place to get done what he wants to get done in the issue areas about which he cares the most. He describes himself as "about as liberal as you can get and still get elected." In explaining his decision to leave the House, he said, "You run for reelection all the time. You win one race and a month later, you learn who your next opponent will be." And furthermore, "In the Senate you are one of 100; in the House you are one of 435...You can't accomplish anything." When I asked him after the election what he would miss the least about the House, he smiled, "The two-year term. Now I can do what I want to do well." What Tsongas wants to "accomplish" or "do well" involves public policy. It was a policy issue that got him interested in the Senate race in the first place--Senator Brooke's well publicized vacillation on the Panama Canal Treaty. "The first time I ever thought of the Senate was this spring," he said during
his campaign. "I got mad at Brooke for the way he was handling the Panama Canal issue. One day in February, I called Dennis and Rich (his two top aides) and asked them "What would you say about a Senate race?" They freaked out...Before that, whenever anybody mentioned the Senate, I always said, "I'm in the wrong state. You've got Kennedy and you've got Brooke."

Having found Brooke vulnerable and having, as I indicated last time, run a perfect campaign, he now speaks constantly of his issue interests. "My four issues," he tells everyone "are energy, Africa, the cities and the environment." And they are long-term interests of his. "I can be good on those four issues because I'm interested in them. I'd be interested in them if I were in private life." They were his issues in the House. "The only thing that makes sense," he says "is to stay with the issues you come here with. Anything else is a goddamned waste of time." His three committee requests--Energy, Foreign Relations, Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs--reflect these continuing policy interests. He went to Washington five times in December to lobby the members of the Steering Committee for the one available Foreign Relations slot on the grounds that his two years in the Peace Corps in Ethiopia made him the most knowledgeable Africanist
in the Senate and the logical successor to Dick Clark. "$\text{The major formative influence of my life in the Peace Corps and all the Peace Corps stands for,}" \ he says. "$\text{That's where I'm coming from.}" \ He lost the Foreign Relations assignment; but he received his other two choices. And he announced to the Democratic caucus that he was already a candidate for the next Foreign Relations vacancy. "$\text{No matter what my committee assignments are,}" \ he said later, "$\text{my priorities will remain the same. Eventually, my committees will be Energy and Foreign Relations. The only question is when.}" \ Tsongas sees his issue interests as future oriented. We can expect him to be organizing his Senate life around them for the next several years.

David Pryor's personal goals are different. They are electoral. So far as one can tell, he has always wanted to be a United States Senator. "$\text{I don't know why I wanted to be a senator,}" \ he says, "$\text{to serve people, to fulfill my ambition or to pass legislation. But my attitudes toward politics is portrayed in the movie 'Patton.' There is this battlefield scene with the dead lying everywhere. The vultures are flying over head. Arms, legs,}"

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bodies and blood everywhere. Patton rides in and stands there in his Jeep taking it all in and then he says 'I love it. I love it.' That's just the way I feel about politics." In accordance with Joseph Schlesinger's theory of political ambition, Pryor has moved from office to office up the opportunity hierarchy to the Senate. "I have been running for something all my life" he told a group of retirees in the Ozarks. "I remember when I ran for President of the third grade in Camden Elementary School. There were four candidates. Miss Betty Wheeler told the four of us to leave the class. We waited outside in the hall. I prayed. I prayed that if I just got elected President of the third grade, I would never aspire to another office in my life. Miss Wheeler came into the hall and said, 'David, congratulations, you've been elected President of the third grade.' Before I got back to my seat, I was trying to figure out how I could be President of the fourth grade." At least since he was 16, the summer when he was a Senate page, the United States Senate has been at the top of his personal hierarchy of offices. Getting to the Senate--winning--has been his major goal. And so the transition period, for him, has been a time of great savoring. When I first saw him in his nearly barren office in January, he

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spread his arms, looked around, exclaimed "Well, here I am. Is this what I've wanted for so long?" He was pleased to have landed an office in the oldest building. "We won one victory already. We got an office in this building. It's much more—what would you say—Senatorial? Who do you suppose has sat in this office? Arthur Vandenberg, Henry Cabot Lodge, John Kennedy? There's a history to this place and I want to know it." When I returned in May, he was reading about the Senate. [Profiles in Courage—"a pretty good history of the institution,"] And he was still savoring his new status. Unlike Tsongas, who had never stopped campaigning, Pryor had paused to soak in and to savor his new surroundings. "When I was a page, there was to me a distinctive smell to the Capitol. It was part smoke, part granite, part leather, and part something else. I don't know what. The other day I caught whiff of that smell I remember from my boyhood."

It would be tempting to say that Pryor's major goal now is reelection. But the six year term is long enough to encourage at least an interim interest in governing. That is why we have found the notion of a cycle intriguing. Moreover, it is not at all clear that Pryor even wants to be reelected.
On a trip through the Ozarks this spring, he kept musing about retirement.

"Do you think I would be happy retiring after one term in the Senate? I could say that I've done it all." Implicit in the idea that he has "done it all" is that having achieved the highest elective office to which he could reasonably aspire, there are simply no other goals left. For now, his electoral goal has been met; yet no other goal has emerged to move him.

Just as Paul Tsongas' committee requests showed well developed and intense policy interests, David Pryor's requests reflected the lack of them. He requested Finance, Agriculture and Governmental Affairs; he got his second two choices. He didn't lobby hard and he had no emotional investment in the outcome. "Frankly," he said in January, "I'm not worried about my committee assignments. I once said that if I got elected I wouldn't ask for any committees. I'd rather be a free spirit, a rover, a humming bird sipping nectar from many different flowers. I'm undisciplined. I don't like to sit there for hours on a subject." But the most durable internal norm of the House and Senate is specialization. So it will be interesting to see whether Pryor develops any distinctive issue interests. He probably
will; that is because he always has. As his AA put it, "When he was in the state legislature, he was known as a reformer; in Congress he was known for his concern for the elderly; as governor he was known as a fiscal conservative; in the Senate, it's too early to tell." And so it is. For now, David Pryor is exactly where he most wants to be in this world. But for us, as for him, it is not clear what he will be doing in the next few years.

"Does Bill Cohen have any special issues?" Dave Pryor asked me one day.

"Or is he a generalist like me?" The answers are "yes" and "no." Unlike Pryor, Bill Cohen spent his first six months immersed in a single issue area--specializing in conventional fashion in the work of his major committee assignment--Armed Services. His January to May schedule showed 83 committee meetings to Pryor's 52. "Ninety percent of my time has been taken up so far with Armed Services. I'm learning all the acronyms--studying a great deal," he said in March. In May, it was the same refrain.

"Armed Services dominates my time. I'm going over now to put in an amendment on the MX to try to force them to make a decision. The hawks

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won't like it and the doves won't like it. So I'm having some fun rattling cages and learning. I'm still learning acronyms and missile systems...But I don't know anything yet." In making his committee request, Cohen had been no more issue-oriented than Pryor. Unlike Tsongas, he brought no guiding policy interests with him from the House. "I didn't do anything" Cohen explained, "I was very cavalier about it...I honestly didn't know what I wanted...A vacancy opened up (on Armed Services) on the second round and I took it. I said "why not?" It was something completely different...so it was just happenstance. It's consistent with everything else that's happened to me in my life. I didn't do anything and the opportunities just opened up." This latter theme is a familiar one when Cohen talks about his career and his goals. "I never planned to make politics my career. Things just happened that way." Or, "I don't know what I'm going to do from one moment to the next." The importance he places on chance makes his personal goals more difficult to classify than those of Tsongas or Pryor. Perhaps the best way to put it is that he has no long-term goals at all. He is very intense and competitive about whatever engages him at the moment, but there is no sense that he is pursuing some
deeply held goal—either electoral like Pryor or policy like Tsongas. He is, rather, always reacting to a personal challenge. "What was that line that Fleetwood Mac says, 'It's not the outcome, but the action?', Cohen asked during the campaign. "It's the chase I care about. And I care less about the prize. I don't want to be anything less than totally engaged in whatever I do. And I can do a lot of other things in the big ocean out there besides politics." "Deep down in my guts, I'd most like to be a musician." Whenever you drop in on him, he is thoroughly engaged; yet he always seems prepared to move on to the next challenge. He campaigned furiously; but he said privately, "The truth is I don't care that much about the Senate. I don't need it." In fact, he adds, he very nearly didn't run for it. "I had three alternatives this year. I could have run for governor, which I didn't want. I could have run for the Senate or retired from politics. It was a very iffy proposition between the last two. I considered very seriously getting out and trying something else...But I thought that if ever I was going to make a try for the Senate, this was the time." Staying in the House was not an alternative. "I'm just vegetating there. I'm bored. You can't accomplish anything—you just
wait." What Cohen means by accomplishing something is not policy-related, as with Tsongas. It means meeting whatever challenge, chance and happenstance has placed before him. That is what occurred in the House when the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment inquiry thrust him into the national spotlight and converted him, willy nilly, into a prime Senate possibility. But the House held no further challenge for him—the more so because he was a member of the Republican minority. Having met the next challenge—of the Senate campaign, he faced the challenge of winning to the challenge of Senate membership. He moved from the challenge of winning to the challenge of governing. He defined that challenge as being a good senator. Recall his desire to be known as "a substantive senator" and "a work horse." Recall his immersion in the work of the Armed Services Committee. If we are to think of Bill Cohen's Senate behavior as goal-oriented, it would be most helpful to think of him as interested in achieving inside influence in the Senate. That is, he wants the kind of reputation among other senators that is the underpinning of inside influence. And we can expect him, over the next few years to behave in ways calculated to secure that underpinning—unless, of course, another
non-senatorial challenge should present itself to him.

Much has been written, in books on the Senate, about how one achieves reputation and influence inside the institution. It is something every senator thinks about. In the House, some of the members will be perpetually preoccupied with the two-year electoral cycle. But the lengthened six-year term gives every senator the opportunity and the incentive to think about inside influence. The idea of the senatorial cycle is that there will be, for all senators, a time for governing as well as a time for winning. As part of the governing process, every senator develops some picture of what the Senate is like as an institution and, hence, how he or she can best pursue his mix of goals therein. These pictures of the institution are probably most vivid at the point when senators first enter it. David Pryor's view of the Senate, as you might expect, is the most traditional. He is, of course, a southerner; and his picture is a little reminiscent of William White's loving, lyrical, honey dripping portrait in "Citadel." Except that Pryor—who describes himself as "somewhere between a maverick and a moderate"—is not your old style.
southern senator. Pryor is the man who, as a member of the House worked incognito in a nursing home, then rented a mobile home on Capitol Hill, rallied a group of volunteers and conducted his own investigation of nursing home conditions and care of the elderly when his committee refused to authorize such a study. Still, Pryor alone of the three, speaks of the Senate as "the most exclusive club in the world;" he alone draws detailed pictures of the seating arrangements and the "unwritten rules" of the Senate's "inner sanctum," "senators only" dining room. He alone sees the newcomer's chamber duties as a chance to learn institutional basics. "I spend a great deal of time on the floor--more than most freshmen members," he says. "I preside as often as anyone...they keep a record. The first one to pass 100 hours gets a golden gavel and all that jazz. I log a lot of hours on the floor...because I want to learn the rules and the only way you can learn the rules is to be there most of the time...the longer you are here, the less time you have to learn the rules. So if you don't learn them at the beginning, you never will." What he has learned in the chamber is that "the beauty" and "the strength" of the Senate is that it produces a minimum of impediments in the way of an individual senator's pursuit of his
goals. "Each person is a little island," he says, "and every member respects and protects the right of every other member. The other night, late in the evening, we all sat while a rather unpopular member delivered a defense of an amendment he said in advance he would withdraw. He talked for 20 minutes and then withdrew the amendment. Each of us was saying 'Oh my God!', but each of us said it to himself. No one spoke to another person. Each one was thinking that if he got into that position and wanted to be heard, he would expect to be granted that same respect. That's what makes it a club..." Pryor, as we know, is not yet ready to impose himself on his colleagues on the floor. He has an idea of what it takes to gain inside influence. "In the Senate," he says, "honesty counts and intelligence counts, but what counts the most is whether or not, when you get up to speak, you are prepared." He does not yet feel prepared. Perhaps the fact that he comes directly from the executive branch has left him a bit gun shy. "The thing I had forgotten since I was in the House," he says, "was the quantity and diversity of the issues we have to deal with. I don't have the grasp of the issues that I'd like to have," he said in May. Furthermore, he said, "the house is a large hall and you must
shout to be heard. The Senate is a small room. The best speakers are those who speak as if they were in a living room, in a conversational tone—people who are comfortable in their surroundings. I do not feel comfortable in that room yet and do not have a conversational tone." When he has prepared something to say and when he feels comfortable, the Senate chamber will be the kind of place in which his voice can and will be heard. Much more, he is sure, than would be the House. "The other day I took a constituent on a 20-minute tour of the Capitol...," he said. "Looking down on the (House) it gives you the impression of a metropolitan area. The buses are going every which way; the taxis are crossing in front of the cars; the bells are clanging, the horns are honking. It's disorderly and confusing. When you look down on the Senate, you see a small New England town, with shade trees, no noise on the streets and everything in its place." For the one time president of the third grade in Camden, Arkansas, there's no doubt in which institution he prefers to make his mark. And he is, like the institution he sees from the gallery, in no great hurry.

In the writings on the Senate in the 1950s and 1960s, the adjustment of

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each new senator to the institution was said to be governed by the notion that freshmen should serve an apprenticeship. Donald Matthews' writing in 1960 called it "the first rule of Senate behavior that a newcomer was expected "to keep his mouth shut, not to take the lead in floor fights, to listen and to learn." That so-called "norm of apprenticeship" is no longer important. The ideas being presented here would suggest that other influences—the effects of the campaign, the personal goals of the individual and the individual's picture of the Senate—now hold the key to understanding the early adjustment to the Senate. Paul Tsongas, as we might expect, has behaved less cautiously than David Pryor. By spring, he had taken a leading part in several Senate debates on Africa. His activity grows out of his policy-oriented goals and a view of the Senate as a better forum in which to make an impact in the policy directions he believes in. It is not that he is plunging in all over the place unprepared. His Senate-wide participation has been limited to African policy about which he is knowledgeable. "I'm clearly the most out-front senator on the African issue," he said in May, "there is an editorial in the Washington Post today attacking me on my Rhodesian position. We did an OPEd piece in the Post on
Angola. They are the same views I held in the House, but there I was one of several. I could never afford to hire an African specialist. I had a full page interview in the International Edition of Newsweek. You can have a much greater impact in the Senate—by sheer dint of numbers if nothing else." The smaller number of senators and derivatively, a senator's greater ability to attract media attention and staff specialists—these elements are what make the Senate a better forum than the House. Tsongas constantly makes House-Senate comparisons.

On Staff: The kind of people you can get to help you differs (between the House and the Senate). I said that to a member of my staff (the African specialist) and he said that if I had been a congressman, he wouldn't have applied for the job. I thought that was pretty frank...there's a sense of a difference in the power a senator has.

On Media: There's too much competition over in the House. There are too many bright young guys. In the Senate, I'm one of six or eight on my issues. Maybe I'm the only one. When they asked me to be on the McNeil-Lehrer report (on Rhodesia), my reaction was, 'Of course they should ask me.' That would never happen in the House. When McNeil-Lehrer did a report on Ethiopia, Don Bonker got it. I thought, 'Maybe next time they'll get around to me.'

For someone who, a year earlier could not command media attention anywhere except in the Lowell Sun and the Lawrence Eagle Tribune, the steady upward
spiral can be dizzying. On the Senate floor, he attacked a resolution,
sponsored by African Subcommittee Chairman George McGovern, on Rhodesia by
comparing it to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. It was not the path to
inside Senate influence. It was a learning experience for Tsongas. "My
speech on Rhodesia was fine, but my reference to the Gulf of Tonkin was a
mistake...it cost me with McGovern. He'll get over it, but it will always
stick in his craw. You can't take back remarks like that once they are out
of your mouth... The next time it worked out well. I deferred to the
Foreign Relations Committee. They offered my amendment and I supported
them. When a group of us went down to the White House afterward and came
out of the meeting, there were microphones and the cameras. They got
Church and Javits and I stood behind them waiting my turn. Then I said to
myself, "What am I doing here? And I walked away. I think you can have an
impact if you are not perceived as a media hog." Tsongas is thinking and
learning about inside influence in a different kind of body than the House.
As a place to live and as a place for emotional attachments, Tsongas
expresses none of the contentment with the Senate that David Pryor
expresses. Tsongas misses the ideological and personal camaraderie he
enjoyed with the other Watergate babies of the House class of 1974.

"There's no class of 1978 in the Senate," he said in January. "There is a class—but no brotherhood. It's a much stuffier place than the House," he said in May. "I just went over to the House to wait for the Alaska Lands vote. Everyone came up to me and rushed up. There's a closeness there that isn't here. The Senate is more staid—more lonely. I go over to the House once a week or every two weeks just to see my friends...the 94th class was a remarkable class. There were kindred souls. It's lonely without them." But he did not seek the Senate as an institutional end in itself in the first place.

If the contrast between Pryor and Tsongas is interesting, so is the contrast between Tsongas and former House colleague Bill Cohen. Cohen, as you will recall, has been sticking to his Armed Services Committee business. In his words, "I'm trying to be substantive and to get a reputation as a substantive senator." He has none of Paul Tsongas' nostalgia for the House. "I never go over to the House. It seems a world away and yet it's right down the corridor...I'm completely absorbed over
here." He finds the Senate a more congenial place to work than the House—in committee, for example. "You know you are in the minority," he says, "but you don't feel it like you do in the House. You are treated as an equal...yesterday, I got an MX amendment through in Armed Services. Jackson, Cannon and I were a triumvirate. That would never have happened in the House. They treat you as an equal even if you are a first-term senator. They show you a lot of deference. That amazed me." "I enjoy it here," he says often of the Senate. But he does not see the institution either as the ultimate career satisfaction that it is for Pryor nor as the greater policy forum that it is for Tsongas. It is rather the setting for the latest personal challenge—a challenge he defines as "getting a reputation as a substantive senator." Furthermore, he wants to get that reputation as quickly as possible. "People make judgments about you very quickly here," he said in March. And he added, "It was especially important in my case to start quickly. I came over from the other house carrying a lot of baggage—not all of it favorable. I had gotten a lot of publicity (as a result of Watergate)...People thought I was cocky, arrogant, a guy who throws rocks in the water, anti-Republican, anti-Nixon.
They didn't know me and though I would say to myself, 'they could not think badly of me'—they might very well have been suspicious." He was in short, very concerned about getting off on the right foot—particularly with his Republican colleagues. He has tried to do this first by working hard in committee and second by keeping the lid on the publicity. Unlike Paul Tsongas, who is just emerging somewhat euphorically into the national spotlight, Cohen has had a fairly long history of national media attention. The media made him famous. But in so doing, it also gave birth to the criticism, heard in the campaign, that he is "all style and no substance."

Cohen is a nearly ideal media personality. He draws, therefore, both a lot of attention and a lot of attention to the attributes that make him appealing to the media, i.e., stylistic attributes. On January 2, the Washington Star gave Cohen a full page, first page spread in its Close Up section. The article was entitled, "The Poet Politician from Maine." The lead paragraph began, "They are, well, The Golden Couple—almost too good to be true. The perfect image of the modern politician, easily packaged and merchandised. He is 38, handsome in a clean-cut boyish way; sandy colored hair, sparkling blue eyes, a perfect grin. She is 35, blond,
petite and pretty. Hazel-eyed, glamorous, the cheerleader type. Together the impact is terrific. And so on...the media attention and the excessive attention to style. Both are a mixed blessing to a new senator trying to make a favorable reputation with his colleagues." Later in the Star article there appears the comment by a former House colleague, "I think it's very possible he could become President of the United States." That is a mixed blessing, too. So, with the media throttling up, Cohen has been throttling down. And his early Senate days have been spent in part holding back the publicity, staving off the media lest they spoil his adjustment to the Senate. "I have stayed away from the press—deliberately," he said in May. "I've done very few interviews, all of them off the record. I'm asked to do them all the time, but I've been refusing. I'm keeping a low profile, avoiding publicity. I've turned down Issues and Answers and a lot of the magazines." Cohen has a theory about excessive media coverage. As he said during the campaign, "I've always felt there's a duality in relations with the press. On the one hand, they enjoy watching you rise to prominence. Then when they have puffed you up, they enjoy taking a pin and pricking you and watching you collapse." Or, in May, "the media likes to
build you up and tear you down...I know the press will cut me up soon enough, and I'd rather have it later." For now, he wants to succeed inside the institution; to meet that challenge he does not need and does not want the intrusion of the mass media. It is another indicator of Cohen's desire to make the speediest possible transition from the atmospherics of winning to the atmospherics of governing.

That is all I have to say about the early part of the senatorial cycle and about the transition it brings from winning to governing. It is all I know. At this point, I could not possibly generalize about the process of governing in the Senate—nor even about how these three individuals will eventually be involved. One of the most difficult problems for students of legislature is to move from analyses of legislature to analyses of the institution—from individual behavior to collective performance. Still, the individuals I have portrayed are senators and I may have begun to isolate, through them, some of the elements I shall need to understand if I am to understand the Senate—elements such as the constraining effects of campaigns, the personal goals of individual senators and their perspectives.
on the institution in which they work. But it will be a lengthy process.

If, for example, the idea of senatorial cycle with which I have been playing in these lectures seems to be worth pursuing further, I may keep dropping in on these three senators over the entire length of their six-year cycle. Ezra Pound wrote in one of his poems, "If a man don't occasionally sit in a Senate, how can he pierce the dark mind of a senator." Since I aim to pierce the dark minds of some senators, I shall continue to go occasionally to sit in the Senate. But, as this talk doubtless has made clear, it will take many, many sittings.