followed one group of four senators from 1978 to 1984 and another group of
four senators from 1980 to 1986. I campaigned, too, with nine other
senators and "wannabe" senators, who subsequently lost their elections and
who then disappeared from my angle of vision.

That angle of vision has given me a view of two very different political
contexts—the constituency at home and the Senate in Washington. And the
two contexts have provided a view of two distinctive political activities—
campaigning and governing. At home, the distinctive activity is
campaigning; in Washington, the distinctive activity is governing. These
two activities—campaigning and governing—running for office and running
the country—are the basic processes of congressional politics. Each
engages a goal common to all our legislative politicians. In campaigning,
their goal is to get elected and reelected. In governing, their goal is to
get something done of a substantive, policy nature. Taken together, these
two activities and the pursuit of the two goals consume most of their time
for most United States Senators.
The relationship between these two activities is important to the way our political system runs, and I want to talk about it here this evening--mostly from a political scientist's standpoint, but also, where I can, from a citizen's standpoint as well.

The first point I would make is that the two activities are separable from one another. When George Bush's 1988 campaign manager and current Republican National Chairman, Lee Atwater, died three weeks ago, one analyst wrote "He was the first (campaign) consultant ever to chair either major party, unabashed in his love of politics, but unequivocal in his distaste for governing." (D&C, 3/31/91) For Atwater, campaigning and governing were separate businesses; he loved one, he hated the other. This description of Atwater reminds me of what one of Dan Quayle's Senate campaign managers, said to me after he had spent six months spent working in Quayle's Senate office,

This is my last day in the office. My fingers began to get itchy to do some campaigning. I love the politics side of things, but
not the governing side. And the two have nothing to do with one another. What it takes to get elected has nothing to do with what it takes to govern once you get here. I'm fed up with all the governing bullshit...when it comes to figuring out where to get $16 billion more out of the budget, let someone else do it.

As a matter of people's interest, therefore, campaigning and governing are separable. They are separable, too, because they may require different political skills. Bob Michel, the Republican leader in the House of Representatives, said recently, "It's one thing to be out there on the stump flapping your gums, it's another thing to put something together. Some of the greatest talkers around here couldn't legislate their way out of a paper bag." (Q 10/27/84) Michel's preference—for governing over campaigning—was the reverse of Lee Atwater's. But the point was the same. Campaigning and governing are different.

A former Senator with whom I travelled—John Culver, Democrat of Iowa, and the very one who got booed at the ballpark—elaborated on these differences...
in both interest and talent when we talked:

I'd like to see someone ask every member of the Senate to rank each senator in terms of his effectiveness and his respect among his fellow senators and then I'd like to have that ranking correlated with each senator's popularity rating among the people of his state. I'll bet, and I'd like to see this tested, that there is no correlation between the two. It is easy today for members to look good at home by taking cheap shots at other politicians, to run against the Congress...to crank up their public relations operations in the state, to thumb their noses at everything in Washington and run up huge popularity margins. Yet, in the Senate they are useless. You take Zorinsky, why he's the laughing stock of the Senate. Yet his popularity rating is high in Nebraska...or you take Gaylord Nelson (of Wisconsin), conscientious and highly respected (in the Senate); yet Bill Proxmire's popularity rating in Wisconsin is much higher (than Nelson's)...The Senate is a human institution. It is held together and run by the respect, trust,
admiration and affection that senators have for each other. Those who tend only to their public relations and their grandstanding burn every bridge inside the Senate. When you need them to help you, they are no good to you...I'm not saying that you can't be effective at home and in the Senate. But it takes a different set of skills to do the jobs. And it doesn't happen very often.

Senator Culver spoke those words early in 1980. And sure enough, late that year, Gaylord Nelson lost his bid for reelection in Wisconsin. And sure enough, two years after that, both Edward Zorinsky in Nebraska and William Proxmire in Wisconsin were each overwhelmingly reelected—with more than two-thirds of the vote. What John Culver and Bob Michel were emphasizing, of course, was the importance of coalition-building and leadership inside the Senate—the importance of governing, as I call it. "What discourages me," Culver added to his earlier comment, "is that most people don't care about your leadership in the Senate. And it's so hard to communicate that to your constituents. The media doesn't help. They only focus on the things that make news. Leadership doesn't make news."
In Culver's case, interestingly enough, someone did care. One of Washington's finest journalists, Elizabeth Drew, wrote two long pieces in the *New Yorker* about Culver's work in the Senate, and then turned them into a book entitled simply, "Senator." He was her ideal. The one major flaw in the book (which I assigned in class) was that Drew failed to take an equally close and careful look at John Culver's behavior in Iowa. In Drew's inside-the-beltway story, Culver was the best of senators; but in Iowa, he was not. His constituents voted him out of office. He lost, I think, precisely because his interests and his talents lay more in the field of governing than in the field of campaigning. But the fact of the difference in interest and talent remains. So my first point is simply that the activities--campaigning and governing--are separate and we can examine them separately.

But having acknowledged this, we must turn around immediately and make a second point--that the two activities are also connected to one another, both in theory and in fact. All of us, I know, have some elementary
feeling for their connectedness. As citizens or as voters we sense that in a democracy, we expect to use election campaigns to help us decide how and by whom the country should be governed and we expect to use election campaigns to help us have an effect on the governing process. But we also have the feeling—judging by recent controversies—that things don't always work out that way, that from our perspective as voters, the connections we expect between campaigning and governing have gotten out of whack. Consider some of the worries that surfaced during our most recent political season.

First, there was much talk and concern about the 90%-plus reelection rate of incumbents in the last few congressional elections. That worry triggered proposals to impose limits on the length of legislative terms, proposals which passed in Oklahoma, Colorado and California. The argument is that campaigns in which incumbents always win, deprive voters of control, produce insensitive legislators, lead to undesirable governing performances, and decreased public confidence in the legislative institution. In recent polls, no more than one-quarter of Americans
express "quite a lot" of confidence in the Congress, or "approve" of the job Congress is doing. (Am. Ent. Jan/Feb 1991). When asked whether they favor term limitations, three-quarter of them say "yes." (Ibid)

Second, consider the public outrage over the activities of the "Keating Five", a drama which played daily this winter on CSPAN. Here the complaint is that contributions made to influence the process of campaigning have intruded upon--indeed, corrupted--the process of governing. Forty percent of the nations' citizens believe either that one-half or more of the members of Congress are "financially corrupt." (Ibid) In this case, our instinct is to want to further separate or insulate campaigning and governing, whereas in the case of incumbency, our instinct is to want to bring the two activities closer so as to relate better to one another.

We might note, then, that sometimes the closeness of the connections help and sometimes it hurts. The matter of balance, it seems, is crucial.

A third recent concern is the widespread public distaste for negative campaigning. Columnists described the 1986 Senate election as "ugly,
unedifying and unprecedentedly expensive" and "the nastiest, silliest, most vacuous, vicious campaign year in history." (Shribman, WSJ, 11/7/86; Grady, Ph.D, 11/5/86) And they described the 1988 campaign as "the dirtiest in television history..." (It) featured more negative television advertising than ever before." (Taylor, Washington Post, 2/17-19/89) Here, the complaint is that such campaigns drive out the kind of information that allows voters to assess the candidate's future governing behavior. George Bush, we recall, was widely criticized for the negative Willie Horton campaign in large part because it did not tell us what he would do if and when he achieved office. Put differently, to the degree that campaigns are nasty, governing may get nasty, too. Six months after the 1988 elections, having watched congressional blood-letting over Jim Wright, John Tower, Oliver North, Robert Bork, etc., the Washington Post headlined one of its analyses, "Campaign Dirt is Muddying Congress: The Ills of Elections Have Begun to Infect the Process of Governing" (Balz, WP, 5/8-14/89). Here, our instinct is to want to force campaigning candidates to talk more about how, if elected, they would govern, and eliminate the personal attacks. As with each of the other concerns, the politicians seem not to be cooperating to
alleviate the problem; and there is a growing popular sentiment to take back the campaigning-governing relationship from the control of the politicians.

I mention these worries—about long incumbencies, large campaign contributions and negative campaigns—to demonstrate the extent to which public interest does already center on the connections which link campaigning and governing and to suggest the importance of those connections to the workings of a democratic political system. That is, I'm trying to convince you that I'm studying something important.

And, I hope that what I have to say will shed some light on these system-wide, system-level public concerns. But I am going to step back—or step down—from these specific worries and talk about campaigning and governing and their connections from my own perspective. I'm going to talk about what I know, and that means what I have learned from my own experience with politicians. My perspective comes from years of looking over the shoulders of politicians, one at a time, to learn how they see their world, to
understand how and why they campaign and govern as they do, and whether and how and why their campaigning and governing activities are connected to one another. It is perspective on individual senators, not on the larger system.

With each of eight U.S. Senators, I have studied their behavior over the course of one complete six-year electoral cycle. From my viewpoint, therefore, campaigning and governing are connected because they occur in sequence. That is, for each senator, the six-year cycle begins with a campaign at home, followed by a period of governing in Washington, followed in turn by another campaign at home. At the front-end of the sequence, campaigning is followed by governing; but at the back-end of the sequence, governing is followed by campaigning. This patterned sequence—from campaigning-to-governing-to-campaigning—is, I think, the controlling sequence of every senators' political life. And it has become the controlling conceptualization of my research. I should like to talk about the connections at both ends of the sequence.
This sequential perspective is also a developmental one—enabling me to watch individual politicians change over time, to watch them learn, grow, and adjust, to watch them build a set of accomplishments, develop a governing style and acquire a reputation. In each case, what I am watching and tracing is the development of a political career—a career that gets shaped by the rhythms of campaigning and governing, and by an accumulation of campaigning and governing experiences.

Of course, for each senator I have only studied one six-year segment of a much longer career. When I take up with them, they are already embarked on their political careers and so I find them in various stages of learning and accomplishment. Some will have begun a long time ago—some fairly recently. And so I always need to scramble at the beginning to get in tune with their on-going career as best I can.

My most strenuous effort at catch-up occurred when I met Senator John Glenn in 1980. He had already had the most spectacular pre-Senate career of any 20th century senator—as Marine and astronaut, after his first orbital
flight, and as America's greatest peace-time hero. Almost everything about
John Glenn the senator must be understood in terms of his pre-Senate
career—for example, his idea that politics is public service, his distaste
for the bread and butter routines of politics, for hand shaking at home and
for deal cutting in Washington, and the zeal with which he has protected
his pre-Senate reputation as an American hero as Buck Rodgers, Huckleberry
Finn and John Wayne all wrapped in one.

I watched and talked and travelled with John Glenn for six years during his
Senate campaign in 1980, during his presidential campaign in 1981, 1982 and
1983, and his reelection campaign in Ohio in 1986. In the three campaigns
I watched and in every campaign of his I read about, the one issue which
got John Glenn excited was an attack—real or imagined—on his character.
For all of his political life, his main problem was how to develop a
political persona different from the astronaut persona, or how to pursue a
political career without damaging his hero's reputation. This problem made
him a very reluctant, a very ambivalent and a very slow learner, politically. And his failure to resolve this fundamental dilemma, his
failure to reconcile his political ambition with his hero's reputation, eventually doomed his 1984 presidential candidacy. Though it did not, I might add, harm him in the least in his Ohio reelection campaign two years later.

He was not harmed, that is, until—irony of ironies—he became entangled in 1990 in a first class political scandal, as one of the so-called "Keating Five." Since that is my only special window on the ethics controversies of recent years, let me make one or two comments on the Glenn case.

John Glenn is the last senator I ever would have thought would have gotten himself involved in such a mess. No senator ever valued his reputation for honesty and integrity—as a public trust and, indeed, as a deeply felt duty to his nation—more than John Glenn. His problems stemmed, in my opinion, from a disastrous decision he made in February of 1984. After his campaign had gone down in flames in the Iowa caucuses and after every professional observer had pronounced his candidacy dead, he borrowed $2.5 million dollars from Ohio banks to keep his campaign going. He spent the money in
New Hampshire and in several southern states, continued his downward spiral and quit three weeks later, broke. When I talked with him afterwards, he was obsessed and depressed about the debt. "It keeps me awake at night," he said. And to this day, John owes nearly $2 million dollars of it and has absolutely no prospect of repaying it.

His opponent in the 1986 reelection campaign hammered him mercilessly on the unpaid debt and the shadow it cast on Glenn's reputation as Mr. Clean. It did not work; but it was not pleasant. I do not believe Glenn ever would have taken so large a sum of money as he did from one person--$200,000 from Charles Keating, if he had not been desperate to repay that enormous debt and redeem his honor. He might certainly have responded anyway to a call for help from Keating, who was afterall a long-time constituent and member of a prominent and respected Ohio political family. I do not know. But the damaging quid pro quo connection between the legislative favor and the campaign money would not have been there. Money, and the huge amount of it necessary to fund modern political campaigns, was the root of the evil—or the perceived evil—in this case. Or so I
believe. Even though Glenn was judged to be one of the two least culpable of the five senators involved, the reputation he spent his political life protecting, has been sullied.

To go back to the beginning of my association with Glenn, his 1980 campaign resulted in a record-breaking state-wide victory margin; and it had a huge effect on his political career. That is because he viewed his victory as making him a legitimate presidential candidate. Had he not won so big, he might never have run. As he said:

I did not think about the presidency until after the 1980 election. There had been talk before, but I never took it seriously. The first time I thought seriously enough about it so that I wouldn't make a Shermanesque (refusal) was after my 1980 victory. Given the election margin I received, and given the fact that I was one of the few senators, especially from a large state, who went against the (Reagan) landslide, I thought I ought to get out and speak on things...
Glenn's decision to run for President as a result of his reelection campaign in Ohio helped lead me to identify one important connection between campaigning and governing, at the front-end of the campaigning-governing-campaigning sequence. It is this: that the winning campaigner will interpret the results of his or her campaign and that interpretation will, in turn, influence his or her future governing activity. From the standpoint of the individual politician, then, his or her interpretation of the election results is a crucial link between campaigning and governing. And, as political scientists, we must study the campaigner's particular interpretation of the election in order to understand his or her subsequent governing activity and, hence, his or her subsequent career.

Let me give another example from my experience. In 1978, I watched Senator Pete Domenici of New Mexico campaign for reelection against a crusading, flamboyant, mediagenic, publicity-conscious Attorney General of New Mexico. Two weeks before election, Domenici was leading by 26 points in the polls. He expected a large winning margin. On election day, he won by only six
points. He was disappointed and unhappy at the size of his victory—indeed he interpreted it more as a defeat than a victory. His press secretary kept saying "The reason we lost...was..." Domenici's interpretation of the election result was that his opponent had overwhelmed him in the media, that his own campaign had been insufficiently aggressive in winning media attention. When he returned to Washington he was determined to change all that.

He told his Washington staff after the election that "the number one concern of this office is press." And they began preparing feature articles, news releases, legislative schedules for the press. Over the next six years, Domenici hired and fired five press secretaries—who called him variously "fanatical," "obsessed," or "paranoid" about press coverage. When we talked in Washington a year after his reelection, he complained, "I'm doing a good job. Why does that (New Mexico) reporter stick it to me all the time? He never writes anything good about me. The best I ever get is a news story and then it usually has a little editorial zinger in there." Travelling around meeting constituents in New Mexico a year after
that, he spoke sarcastically about "the great New Mexico press," and complained that, "It's frustrating. I want the people of New Mexico to know what I'm doing... (that) I'm a (Washington) player now... I have a problem with the state's biggest newspaper... they don't think I've got any good ideas, or that I'm smart or that I think about national problems. It's like pulling teeth." Domenici's media-based interpretation of his reelection campaign shaped part of his governing behavior in Washington for several years.

Pete Domenici's electoral interpretation lost its influence on him only when events intervened to thrust upon him one of Congress' most important governing tasks. The surprise results of the 1980 elections put the Republicans in charge of the Senate and made Domenici chairman of the Senate Budget Committee. In this position Domenici started responding to Ronald Reagan's interpretation of his 1980 Presidential election and of the Senate election results. Reagan took the view that he had campaigned on a budget-cutting, tax-cutting platform, that he and a Republican Senate had been elected on that platform and the election results, therefore, gave him
and them a mandate to govern accordingly. On that interpretive basis, Reagan, Domenici and company set out to govern the country—and for a while they did just that in a strong and historic fashion.

It should be noted—with respect to the interpretive linkage between campaigning and governing that I'm explicating here—that it is not the media interpretation or the pundit's interpretation that matters. In 1980–81, neither the press nor the political scientists could find in the election results any clear mandate to govern in a particular way. But no matter. Reagan interpreted the election as a mandate and he governed accordingly. When the public or the academic interpretation of what happened in an election conflicts with the politicians' interpretation of what happened, the politicians' interpretation is what matters—every time.

I do not mean to say that the media cannot have some complementary or reenforcing impact on a campaigner's electoral interpretation. They can. And when they do, they can affect both the campaign, the winner's interpretation and the governing activity that follows.

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An example of this kind of media influence on a senator's electoral interpretation is the case of Bill Cohen of Maine. Unlike Domenici, Cohen began his first campaign for the Senate on a giant wave of favorable national publicity which came to him as a Republican member of the House Judiciary Committee considering the impeachment of Richard Nixon. Cohen's thoughtful, articulate commentary, his personal attractiveness and his independent non-party vote in favor of impeachment made him a darling of the media in 1974, and propelled him into the Senate race—against an incumbent—four years later.

Once in that race, however, Democrats attacked Cohen as a lot of name recognition but no accomplishments—"all style and no substance," they said. And the media, having given him such accolades during Watergate, now joined the attack. As Cohen recalled a conversation with one top reporter, "He asked me if I liked Robert Redford movies." I said, "Yes, I like Robert Redford." He said, "Did you see 'The Candidate'?" I said, "Yes, I thought it was a great movie." He said, "I hear you are patterning your
campaign after Robert Redford in 'The Candidate'." I said, "Come on now. I was campaigning long before that movie came out." He said, "Can I take a picture of your car?" I said, "Sure, but why do you want a picture of my car? You're the one who's always complaining that politics is all style and no substance, and you want to take a picture of my car? Why don't you write about the difference between us on the issues?"

The suggestion of the reporter's inquiry was clear, however, that Cohen might just be the blow dry candidate in the movie, the one who asked after he had won, "Now what do I do"—that is, someone who knew how to get elected but had no idea how to govern. Sure enough, when the reporter published his article in the Sunday magazine section of the Boston Globe, there was the picture of Cohen's car—a Porsche!

Cohen interpreted his election victory as a chance to put to rest the suggestion that he lacked substance. "I want to get a reputation as a substantive senator" he said in March. "Ninety percent of my time has been taken up in my committee. I'm learning all the technical terms—studying a

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great deal." In May he said, "My committee dominates my time...I'm keeping a low profile in the state...I've been studying hard, doing my homework. During the campaign I had to confront the show horse-work horse comparison. I've been trying to be a work horse." His interpretation of the campaign and the media's spin on the campaign were shaping his governing activity. Back on the campaign trail, again, with him last October, I found Cohen still fretting about this love-hate behavior of the media.

Just how long these interpretive effects last is a matter for investigation—longer in the case of Bill Cohen, I think, than in the case of Pete Domenici. But at some point, the time and energy needed to make public policy—that is, to govern—will erode the force of the electoral interpretation. Campaigning will give way to governing, and the early impact of the campaign and the electoral interpretation are bound to diminish. At the end of six years, Bill Cohen had become an expert in military matters; and Pete Domenici had become a highly publicized chairman of the Budget Committee. Still and all, my point is that what you learn by following them around campaigning at home will continue to help you to
understand their governing behavior during their subsequent years in Washington.

Beyond the interpretation a winning candidate places on the election, there lies the business of governing, or policy making, of accomplishing something legislatively—that is, the beginning of a senatorial career. Political scientists have always gotten a lot of mileage out of studying the Senate from the perspective of Senate newcomers. For a long time, we used the "apprenticeship" norm—"be quiet and listen"—to describe their early days in the Senate. We no longer think in those terms; but, all newcomers must still adjust to a new institution. And we can still get explanatory mileage out of watching them undergo that adjustment experience. For about a year during 1981-82, I followed three newly elected Republicans to Washington—Dan Quayle of Indiana, Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, and Mark Andrews of North Dakota. The most interesting of the three was Arlen Specter—mostly because the other two came from the House of Representatives and had less of an adjustment to make. To put it another way, Arlen Specter had much more to learn about a legislative
institution. And it was not easy for him to do so. I want to spend a little time on his difficult adjustment.

There was little doubt about the depth of Specter's ambition. He had served two terms as the District Attorney of Philadelphia, but he had also suffered four successive electoral defeats--two in Philadelphia and two state-wide. That he would have been running at all after these four losses was an early key to one of his dominant political attributes--his persistence. "I've had a life-long ambition to be a senator," he said. "I don't discourage easily. In fact, I don't discourage at all."

His two victories as Philadelphia's District Attorney were itself a remarkable feat for a Republican in a Democratic city. And as he campaigned for the Senate, he talked constantly about his experience as DA. He talked about how he jailed common crooks, unethical reporters, sleazy politicians, corrupt judges. He talked about how "The record I'm running on now is the record I made as DA; and about how "my strongest supporters are people who know the work I did as DA." He presented himself everywhere...
in terms of his prosecutors credentials, hard working, hard charging, aggressive, independent. Everywhere, he contrasted these prosecutor's qualities with the lack of same in his opponent.

Just as his DA successes had molded his political persona, so too had his four political defeats. Two of them had been defeats for Governor and Senator--in the Republican primary. In those cases, Specter had not been the candidate of the party establishment. When I took up with him in 1980, he was running for the third straight time, in a primary against his own party's anointed candidate. "I felt I had been given short shrift by the Republican party" he said..."when it came to the choice plums, they reserved them for others. I was as good as they were, but I never got the nod of the party establishment...I'm not one to shrink from a battle or a fight. So I entered the primary again this year and won." Persistence and independent effort had triumphed over the Republican establishment.

As in the case of Glenn, his pre-Senate career--first as DA and then as state-wide campaigner--influenced the persistence and the independence he
displayed during his Senate campaign. It was important for me to understand these continuities in his career because I found another very close connection between his campaigning and his governing—both stylistically and substantively.

Specter's interpretation of his winning campaign for the Senate against Democrat Pete Flaherty emphasized his District Attorney qualities. As he put it:

He cares, he's energetic, he works hard—that's the issue I beat Flaherty with. It was the only issue between us. I visited all 67 counties. He didn't. There was not any difference between us on other issues. He had a beautiful wife; I had a beautiful wife. I drove a foreign car; he drove a foreign car. I hadn't won anything in 1000 years; he hadn't won anything in 1000 years.

The other part of Specter's electoral interpretation centered on the matter of party loyalty and prospective relations with the new President, Ronald
Reagan, "I didn't come in on Ronald Reagan's coattails," he said, "our election patterns were completely different. I carried Philadelphia; he lost Philadelphia. He carried Pittsburgh; I lost Pittsburgh...It's interesting how that affects your idea of the team. I don't feel I owe Reagan anything." Predictably, there was going to be a lot of the hand charging, independent, persistent prosecutor left in the new U.S. senator, when he took up the business of governing. And I would argue that anyone who wished to understand his governing activity would need to know about both his earlier career experiences and these later electoral interpretations.

Quite predictably, Arlen Specter joined the Senate Judiciary Committee, where he introduced his first important piece of legislation—a bill providing for life imprisonment for career criminals. It was a new idea, and it was his own brainchild, derived straight from his experience as District Attorney. The saga of the bill is so lengthy and tortuous that I have just finished a book about it entitled "Learning to Legislate: The Senate Education of Arlen Specter." Exactly three years after he introduced it, after having once been vetoed, it was signed into law as a
very small and drastically watered down part of a very large omnibus anti-
crime package.

Its passage can be called a triumph for the persistent prosecutor; but its
form and its fates were equally attributable to the limitations of
Specter's notions about governing. In a word they were notions—all born
of his previous experience—that governing was more an individualistic
enterprise than a collective one. He stressed individual effort and
individual expertise rather than the business of negotiating with others or
building coalitions. His experience as DA and with his party left him very
reluctant to incur obligations to others or to put his fate in the hands of
others. "What Arlen doesn't like" said his top aide the day before he
introduced his bill, "is the clubby part of the Senate. He's not a hail
cellow well met type...he won't get into a room with someone he doesn't
like. That's fine but it's not the clubby old boy style that predominates
around here. The trouble is, he doesn't know who he can trust." He
preferred, as always, to go it alone.
The only strategy Arlen Specter ever devised for passing his cherished
career criminal bill was the loner's strategy of bulling the legislation
through by sheer determination, buttressed only by his expertise and by the
conviction that it was the right public policy. He never did develop a set
of strategic decisions about how he was going to maximize support, cope
with disagreement, identify allies, count swing voters, control procedure
or superintend the matter of timing.

On the day he introduced the bill, he had not yet consulted with any member
of the Judiciary Committee. He had no co-sponsors. When asked at his
press conference whether he had any support, he nonetheless mentioned
Chairman Strom Thurmond and Ted Kennedy. They turned out to be anything
but supporters...Thurmond delayed the bill's progress, Kennedy diluted its
substance and the two of them eventually combined three years later to pass
the Thurmond-Kennedy amendment which in Specter's words "gutted and
emasculated (my) bill." From start to finish the Pennsylvania senator
displayed the same deficiencies and miscalculations as a coalition builder.
Said one staffer, "I don't know how many times he has slowed up what we
were trying to do by not really listening to what people were telling him. He hears what he wants to hear and then charges ahead."

One day in March when we talked, the senator reported flatly that, "Denton's for it; Hatch is for it." But when we went over the roster in July he said, "Hatch may be a problem. Denton may go south on me." One day he exclaimed, "I had a terrific meeting with the President...I had a great meeting. Reagan's for it. We're going to get it passed." A year later Reagan vetoed it. Maybe Specter had sold Reagan on the bill like he was selling it to his committee colleagues. "We've been telling them what a great bill it is," he said. "We haven't told them the opposing arguments."

When the National District Attorney's Association—his own former professional colleagues—expressed reservations, he went to their annual meeting and said to them in a speech, "I don't know whether we can get career criminals passed with your attitude as it is. But we're going to try to steamroller you anyway." In the end, it worked exactly the other
way. About the same time, a top staffer commented about the bill's slow progress. "I'm beginning to think we're on a Pickett's charge. Arlen won't make any face-saving maneuvers on the side. He's determined to go straight ahead and all the way." At a point where he needed the help of Judiciary Committee Chairman Thurmond to move his bill along through committee, another staffer said:

Career criminal is going no where fast...I'm not sure Arlen is willing to do the amount of quid pro quo that you need to move the bill along. He thinks it ought to carry on its own merits and do his work for him...if he wants that bill, he's got to swallow his pride, go to Strom Thurmond and say, "Strom, I want that bill more than anything else. My pants are down."

For the senator from Pennsylvania, however, it was an unnatural act to reach for his belt buckle. His reluctance to engage in the give and take essential to success in governing, his go-it-alone, independent posture, was I believe, a lasting derivative of his early experience—as DA, as
Republican party orliiner and of the interpretation of his electoral
victory. It left him with a lot to learn about governing in the Senate.

Specter regarded his criminal bill as the most important domestic policy
initiative of his first term; and a good majority of his governing
erg.ies were devoted to it. One of his staffers who worked on the bill
called it "a success story without a happy ending." When I asked the
senator what he had learned from the experience, about his new career, he
said, "The legal system and the political system are alike in a lot of
ways...but the difference is that you have to do so much consultation and
persuasion with your colleagues. So it takes a lot of time to get anything
done. With the career criminal bill, as you know, we had to be absolutely
relentless about it." He had come to the Senate, I thought to myself,
equipped with all the relentlessness he would ever need. It was
"consultation and persuasion" that he had to learn. His experience had
taught him something about those things. But not yet enough, I thought,
that they were a matter of second nature to him.
On the campaign trail in 1986, Specter indicated that a lot remained of his lopsidedly individualistic view of the governing process in the Senate. "Jesus Christ," he exclaimed, "there are a lot of sharp elbows in there...it's not a snake pit. It's a rhinoceros pit." And he went on expansively. "You have to work like hell to make your case. I've done it by sheer dint of persistence. It's like digging into the side of a granite mountain with your fingernails." I could not have summed up any better than that his political career as it had been shaped to that point by successive sequences of campaigning and governing.

To reflect on this case, we might say that every person who comes to the Senate knows how to win an election. Some of them know how to govern. The rest have to learn. For some it is more difficult and takes longer than it does for others. These are people, we might speculate, whose previous experience has least sensitized them to the collective aspects of governing. Getting elected is a highly individualistic prima donna-type process, so all senators will understand that side of the governing business. But governing—or legislating—is much more of a cooperative,
collegial process than campaigning; and a number of new senators will not have had that kind of experience. They are the ones with the most to learn and they are the ones who will find it most difficult to adjust to governing. Arlen Specter was one of them.

Thus far, I have spoken about the front-end of the six-year electoral cycle, where campaigning flows into governing, where ideas about interpretation and adjustment help us to chart the flow of senatorial careers. At the back-end of the six-year cycle where governing flows into campaigning again, we need to think about different ideas, about different connecting mechanisms. Tentatively, I have begun to think that the central notions linking governing back to campaigning are explanation and the anticipation of explanation. The idea is that in a reelection campaign, what incumbents do is explain to their constituents back home what they have been doing by way of governing in Washington. While they are at work in Washington—making policy, legislating, voting or whatever—incumbents anticipate and worry about what they will say to the folks back home when the time comes to explain a vote, defend a record, embellish a reputation,
present an achievement. Governing style as well as governing substance are matters of explanation and go to make up what I think of as the explanatory process.

I have spent far less time looking at the end of the cycle than I have at the beginning—so that I have no very good generalization about when special attention to explanation and to the explanatory process begins. I'm only sure that it varies. As to how it works, I can cite a couple of examples.

Among the senators I followed, Dan Quayle's 1986 reelection campaign presents the least complicated and purest case in which explanation at home of a governing achievement in Washington carried the day for an incumbent. He explained his governing activity almost wholly in terms of his legislative leadership in the passage of the Joint Training Partnership Act (JTPA). It was a noteworthy personal accomplishment—in terms of strategy, timing, bipartisanship coalition building—in which Quayle displayed all the legislative skills Arlen Specter lacked. And he publicized it...
relentlessly in Indiana. As his campaign manager explained:

JTPA is the whole campaign. It's everything. It's the first thing he talks about everywhere he goes. All our opinion polls tell us that jobs is still the number one issue in the state. He can talk jobs like nobody else can, because he did something about it. It's pure gold. It sews everything together. He brings home the bacon and he is a national leader. JTPA is his suit of armor.

It was a commanding governing performance, so much so that it allowed him to discourage all potentially strong challengers, and persuaded the Democrats not to put up a serious opponent against him. His eventual opponent had no money, no television, no resources with which to challenge Quayle's self-serving explanation of what he had done. The incumbency advantage was overwhelming. In the absence of a challenge, he was able to create himself and advertise himself as he wished. A reelection campaign, we might generalize, is about control of the explanatory process. In 1986 in Indiana, Dan Quayle had complete control of the explanatory process. He
was a large, easy victory—no contest.

The lopsided campaign was no help to the voters of Indiana. But, ironically, it hurt Dan Quayle, too.

The lack of a tough challenger was one of the worst things that ever happened to him. When George Bush looked at the election result, he saw a great campaigner. And Dan Quayle was certainly a better than average campaigner. But he had not been battle-tested in 1986. I watched him campaign a lot, and I never saw him have to confront a hard-hitting attack from anyone—much less from the friendly Indiana media. "What would you like to talk about today Senator," they would ask. His 1986 campaign could have been a testing ground, a training exercise, a toughening up experience, an introduction to the big time. It wasn't. As a result, when the national media jumped on him during the 10 days following his nomination for Vice President, he was unprepared, overwhelmed and thrown so far off balance that he has never recovered. And, what is doubly ironic, he never got any credit in the national press for the legislative

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performance on JTPA that made his Indiana campaign so easy.

All campaigning senators, of course, do not have it so easy. Some lose. Of the senators whose campaigns I followed, five of them lost—Dick Clark in Iowa, John Culver in Iowa, Robert Morgan in North Carolina, Donald Stewart in Alabama, Mark Andrews in North Dakota. In every case, these incumbents lost control of the explanatory process either through over-confidence or through the attack of formidable challengers.

As my own list indicates, Senate incumbents do get defeated fairly often—more often than House members. Of the three Senate newcomers whose governing exploits I followed in 1981-82, one was defeated for reelection. Mark Andrews had been elected nine straight times in North Dakota, eight times for the House and once as a Senator. Despite all the presumed advantages of incumbency, he lost and his political career ended in 1986. Why? Basically because he lost control of the explanatory process—partly through the hard-hitting attacks of a skillful and well-heeled challenger and partly because of his own negligence and miscalculation. From the
beginning to the end of the campaign, Andrews was kept on the defensive, trying to explain first his governing actions and then his personal style.

With the farm economy in very bad shape and getting worse, and with the 1985 farm bill as the most recent unsuccessful legislative effort to change things, challenger Kent Conrad attacked Andrews for his vote in favor of the 1985 farm bill. Everywhere we went, in that campaign, the incumbent spent most of his time explaining that vote, explaining his performance in shaping the bill and explaining the relationship of the farm bill to the farm economy. Andrews, who is himself a farmer, explained that throughout his long career—17 years in the House and six in the Senate—he had worked, above all else, for the welfare of the farmer, that he understood the farmer's interests, that he was the architect of all those provisions in the 1985 bill that protected the special interests of North Dakota's farmers and that in his experienced judgment as a prominent player in all agricultural decisions, the 1985 bill was the best that could be achieved and that it was an improvement over the previous bill. To an outsider, it was an impressive explanatory performance—technically informed and...
politically sensitive. I could see why, despite troubles on the farm in other years, Andrews' had never been in trouble.

But it was very much an insider's explanation, a legislator's explanation, a Washington explanation. Since his constituents couldn't see this for themselves, the success of his explanations depended at bottom, on a defense that amounted to "you know me, you know I'm working for you, you know I'm one of you, trust me." Incumbents have the chance to develop constituent trust, to win from them the benefit of the doubt which comes into play when they come under attack. But incumbents have to work hard to nurture that trust and can squander it through neglect or miscalculation or both. And that is what happened to Mark Andrews. His explanations came too late. And he was never able or willing to take the offensive.

There is no purpose in reviewing the details, but by the time he got to the Senate, he had come to believe that he had done so much for North Dakota--and he had--that the voters would return him no matter what. He believed that they trusted him even to the point where they would understand and
support him when he sued the state's finest doctors to the tune of $10 million dollars for malpractice involving the care of his wife. They didn't. Instead, his lawsuit created a more skeptical attitude toward the incumbent—one the challenger could exploit. Afterward, his challenger said of Andrews, "He was arrogant. He thought he was better than other people, that he knew more than everyone else. I knew how to run a campaign against Mark because I knew what kind of person he was." Conrad said:

If you went after him aggressively, he would react as if you didn't know what you were talking about, but he wouldn't pay attention to the facts. He would just assume he knew what the facts were because he had said what they were...He got so he believed everything he did and said was right, just because he did it or said it. I remember I was watching TV one night when he gave an interview in which he said that as a result of the farm bill, wheat prices had gone up. I couldn't believe he said that. They hadn't gone up, they had gone way down. When I heard that, I said to myself, "I've got him now!" I went right down and we did a TV spot.
that showed what he said and then I said "Mark Andrews was wrong, prices haven't gone up, they have gone way down." I knew I had him... Andrews wanted to debate the thing, so I did a second ad. I had a chart that showed wheat prices dropping the past 90 days. In the middle of the big drop was a tiny little blip. I drew a big blue circle around it and said, "This tiny little price rise is what he's bragging about"...I knew that at some point he would do something like this...stop listening to the facts and believe something was true because he said it was and not because it was a fact. Those two ads boosted us 17 points in the polls.

For whatever complexity of reasons, the voters had stopped giving the incumbent the benefit of the doubt and he had lost enough of his touch so that he failed to recognize that they could no longer be taken for granted. When a bewildered Andrews and I talked afterward, he said, "You're the political scientist, perhaps you can tell me when my love affair with the people of North Dakota ended." He recognized, then, that somehow, somewhere he had become vulnerable. His vulnerability attracted a strong
challenger. The strong challenger did what he is supposed to do; and the
strong challenger is now a U.S. Senator.

To throw a blanket over the Quayle and Andrews cases, the Quayle case is an
example of why incumbents survive, and the Andrews case is an example why
incumbents get beaten. It should be noted in Quayle's case that his
constituents may well have liked what he did, and that his continued
incumbency, therefore, rested on a satisfactory governing performance.
Such may be the case with many incumbents; performance keeps them safe from
challenge. But lacking competition, we cannot be sure. The Andrews' case
demonstrates that incumbents can get vulnerable sometimes because of their
governing activity, sometimes because of their governing style. Both were
involved in the Andrews' case. But what is certainly needed to replace an
incumbent is a challenger strong enough to uncover and exploit existing
vulnerabilities, to force the incumbents to explain and force them to
anticipate the need for explanation. That means recruiting good candidates
and giving them money to go on television.
Television suggests negative campaigning—since that is where it occurs.

Is negative campaigning, then, an important part of a challenger's arsenal in trying to bring down an opponent? On my experience, the answer seems to be, for now, yes. Four of the five senators I watched lose were the object of attacks of one sort or another. Dick Clark was attacked as a baby killer. Donald Stewart as a tool of special interests. Robert Morgan as a flaming un-Christian liberal. North Dakota observers described Kent Conrad's depiction of Mark Andrews as an untrustworthy double-talker, as negative; though by the standards of 1986, it was no more than averagely so. Negative campaigning continues because it works. On the other hand, it does not always work. Arlen Specter's opponent tried by calling him an unpredictable, opportunistic flip-flopper on issues, but he made no headway whatever in the face of Specter's reputation for independence. In Rhode Island last fall, I followed Senator Claiborne Pell in a campaign when he and a very strong challenger made a pact against personal attacks, publicized their pact and with some media scorekeeping pretty much stuck to it.
Negative campaigning is in principle susceptible to adverse public reaction and watchdog work by the media. But what is essential it seems to me is keeping incumbents honest by forcing explanation is electoral competition. The real threat to the larger system is not lengthy incumbency per se—a good deal of which is probably well deserved—but the lack of competition which allows incumbents to survive without being tested. To me, that means campaign finance reform so that challengers can do what they are supposed to do—challenge. Force explanations. Up to now the biggest incumbency advantage is the ability to collect money. If we returned competition to congressional campaigns, we would have fewer valid complaints about the governing phase. Voters would have been able to make some kind of choice and would have to live with it. And term limitation would seem less attractive. Or so it seems to me. With these opinions, however, I have strayed far beyond my own experience and expertise. But I wanted to make some vaguely-related comments about the citizens issues I raised earlier.

To sum up, I shall return to a more neutral stance. My subject has been the career paths of United States Senators—as I have seen it from personal...
observation—at home, in Washington, and over time. From that angle, the idea of a political career is perfectly neutral—neither a good idea nor a bad idea—but a patterned sequence of individual aspirations and activities that can be described—some of which the individual politician does not control. The desire to get reelected or the desire to help govern the country which propel politicians along this career path are also neutral—in my view—neither good nor bad but simply present in all of them. From that angle, one can describe a normal career path—which takes each politician from campaigning to interpreting the results to governing and then to explaining those governing activities while campaigning again. There is, of course, plenty of room left for making judgments about how well this all works for them and for us. My hope is that my angle and my stories may help to inform those judgments when they are made—by you.