In the summer and fall of 1978, I travelled around the country, off and on, observing several people campaigning for the United States Senate—seven people to be exact—three incumbent senators and four non-incumbents, each in a different state. Two of the incumbents and three of the non-incumbents won their elections in November. And in the winter of 1979, I visited Washington, off and on, to observe the activities of these winners in the Senate. At the moment, I have no idea how my earliest observations will contribute to an understanding of the Senate. My hope—that they will become useful building blocks in some future structure—is largely a matter of faith. Admiral Horatio Nelson prepared his naval commanders for the battle by advising them, "If you bring your ship alongside the enemy, you cannot go too far wrong." My idea is that if I bring myself alongside some real live senators, I cannot go too far wrong. But as I say, that is a matter of faith. And I do not know how it will all come out. I do know that most of what I have to say this week will be neither surprising nor new. But I have to start organizing my observations for myself.
Election campaigns can first be thought of as taking place over time. As the saying goes, "time is the stream we go fishing in." From that perspective, my own observations of the seven campaigns were never more than fleeting glimpses. I would drop in--travel for two or three days, say from Des Moines to Marshalltown to Waterloo to Oelwein to Waverly to Charles City to Mason City--and drop out again. On each occasion, I stepped into a continuous stream of events. A lot had happened before I got there and a lot would happen after I left. While I was there, I scrambled to reconstruct what had gone before and to attune myself to the rhythm of the campaign. But what you see depends on when you drop in. And in only two cases did I drop in more than once on a single campaign. Never, therefore, did I see a whole campaign. That is why my observations concern campaign flow more than campaign organization or campaign decision-making.

If there were such a thing as a model campaign which was carried around by experts and applied in all states, you could recognize immediately what you...
were seeing and where you were in the campaign flow. But there is no such thing as a model campaign. Says one presidential campaign manager, "Most campaigns don't work. Everybody in the business is an amateur." Says another, "Campaigns are, by their nature, disorganized, impossible to control...there's no such thing as a professional in this business." No candidate or campaign manager, that is, is free to do whatever he or she might wish to do in the abstract. Campaigns are run in a particular set of circumstances. Running them is as problematical as observing them—and for the same reasons of circumstantial constraints.

Whenever you drop in on a campaign, you find—to put it most abstractly—a particular candidate with a particular accumulation of resources pursuing a particular strategy for winning within a particular context. The major resources are the name recognition, the campaign experience and the base of support with which a candidate begins the campaign and the momentum which the candidate develops during the campaign. The major contextual elements are the geographical constituency in which he runs, the strengths and weaknesses of the opponent against whom he runs and the issue climate in
which he runs. Campaign strategy involves a plan that employs available resources in the existing context so as to get more votes than the opponent. Resources, context and strategy are the key elements of every campaign; but their interplay differs from one campaign to another.

The interplay of these elements also differs from time-to-time during any single campaign. I came to think of individual campaigns as having an internal, developmental rhythm. When you drop in on a campaign, the first thing you try to do is to attune yourself to that internal rhythm. "How's it going?" you ask. And the answers you get have to do with whether the candidate is gaining, losing or holding steady, whether the long-run chances for his success are improving, worsening, or impossible to figure. You get a kind of updated flow chart of the campaign's progress and prospects.

Over time, a campaign's internal rhythm can change drastically. When I dropped in on Iowa Senator Dick Clark's reelection campaign in mid October, the answer to "How's it going?", was "Just fine." He was holding the same
10-11 point lead over challenger Roger Jepsen in the Iowa poll that he had held since the campaign began. Clark's private poll showed him with a 30 point lead. He was running a cautious, low key, low profile campaign. "With the poll showing a 30 point lead," he said later, "the last thing we needed was to create more interest in the campaign. We had a great reluctance to make the campaign any more visible than necessary...With the poll being so lopsided, God, you don't take chances. It's like a football game, where you have three minutes to play and are three touchdowns ahead. You don't pass." The Clark forces, to continue the analogy, were confidently running out the clock when I dropped out of the campaign. And when I asked Clark later what had happened after I left, he said, "Nothing much happened. With respect to any obvious difficulties, we didn't think anything had happened—until the returns came in." One of his top campaign aides described the drastic change in the campaign's internal rhythm—a change which occurred at the very end of the trail.

We were so goddamned confident. Election day was beautiful, the nicest November day you could have in Iowa. When we saw that, we knew we were going to win. That settled it. It was the in the bag. The first bad news we heard was in the early afternoon when the Des Moines Register poll of people as they came out of the

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voting booth showed Jepsen, 56; Clark, 44. That was a one o'clock poll and was phoned in by a friendly reporter. We didn't believe it. Then when their four o'clock poll came in, it showed Jepsen, 53; Clark 47, so we began to breathe easier. Then, around nine o'clock just before the polls closed, we learned the Register scrapped the whole thing because they felt the sample was all screwed up. 'Well, that clinches it,' we said. And we were happy as could be. Twenty-five minutes later, ABC declared Jepsen the winner.

When the internal development of campaigns takes sharp turns of this nature, one has reason to believe that campaigns do matter—that, at the very least, what happens during Senate campaigns has some bearing on who gets to the Senate and who does not. And as the Clark-Jepsen case also illustrates, who gets there as a result of a single campaign can make an irreversible difference on approximately 3,000 subsequent roll call votes. In 1978, Dick Clark's conservative coalition opposition score was 94%; in 1979, Roger Jepsen's conservative coalition score was 1%.

It is helpful, I think, to conceive of every campaign as made up of two campaigns. The first involves a campaign to convince workers to work for you. The second involves a campaign to convince voters to vote for you. From the first campaign, the candidates gets an organization, volunteers...
and contributions—special commitments of time, energy and money. Those who make such commitments are his or her hard-core supporters. From the second campaign, the candidate gets a much wider, but less permanent kind of support—a one time willingness to vote for him in preference to his opponents. These two campaigns of which I speak proceed simultaneously from the beginning to the end of the overall campaign. But the worker-oriented campaign is most intense in the early stages and the voter-oriented campaign is most intense in the latter stages of the overall campaign. At any point in time, the degree to which these two campaigns mesh will have a bearing on the success of the total campaign. Over time, the campaign will move from one emphasis to the other, will move steadily outward in a series of ever-larger concentric circles from the strongly committed to the weakly committed. In these terms, Dick Clark's campaign failed in its penultimate stage to win support from the outermost circle of voters—the weak Clark supporters and the undecideds.

In the abstract, two ingredients are basic to a successful campaign rhythm—or to a successful two-campaign rhythm. The first is credibility; the
second is momentum. Credibility involves the legitimacy of the candidate. Is he or she qualified and worth listening to? Credibility also involves the electability of the candidate. Does he or she have some plausible chance of winning? If, at first, hard-core supporters and, subsequently, voters give "yes" answers to these questions of legitimacy and electability, the candidate gains credibility. As credibility grows, the likelihood that the candidate will win increases. And this increase in his chances of winning we call momentum. In rough correspondence to the two campaigns, candidates who win credibility and support among workers gain a kind of first stage momentum. Then, as they win credibility and support among voters, they gain second stage momentum. Successful campaigns can be viewed, developmentally, as following a credibility-momentum-credibility-momentum spiral. There is a lift-off stage and a booster stage--perhaps several booster stages--to keep the campaign going.

Every campaign strategy involves a developmental plan for getting and keeping credibility and forgetting and keeping momentum. If successful, momentum becomes a resource that is further manipulable by the candidate to
maintain the credibility-momentum spiral. Candidates themselves, of course, exercise some control over their own momentum. But only some. When campaign managers say that campaigns "don't work" or are "impossible to control," momentum is one element they have in mind. Or, more generally, campaign rhythm. These generalizations are more easily illustrated in the campaigns of challengers than in the campaigns of incumbents. We shall discuss some challengers first and then make our way to incumbents.

The 1978 Democratic campaigns of Richard Leone in New Jersey and Paul Tsongas in Massachusetts, illustrate contrasting campaign rhythms. Leone's campaign achieved first stage momentum and then stalled out. Tsongas' campaign achieved both first and second stage momentum. Indeed, Tsongas momentum continued past the primary and into the general election. The two primary campaigns also illustrate the different degrees of control which candidates exercise over their campaigns—Tsongas achieving more control than Leone. And, finally, the two campaigns illustrate some of the factors affecting both campaign rhythm and candidate control—particularly the mass
Dick Leone was a 37 y/o, former state treasurer (appointed) of New Jersey, the first Ph.D. from Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School and a teacher of public finance at Princeton when he decided to run. He had been governor Brendan Byrne's campaign manager in his first successful race for Governor in 1973, and he had been a key advisor in Byrne's successful reelection race. He was running against basketball star Bill Bradley and State Senator Alex Menza. When I dropped in on him, his campaign, which had once had momentum, had lost it. The answer to, "How's it going?" was, "Badly."

It was a campaign which Leone had once controlled but no longer did. "I was blown off course," he said, "by events over which I had no control."

And he added, "The campaign has taken on a life of its own."

Leone's early strategic problem had been to establish himself as the most credible liberal candidate among the three, Congressman Andrew Maguire, State Senator Alex Menza and himself, who aspired to the Senate. This Leone did brilliantly; and it was the triumph of his campaign. He
consolidated his hard-core support among, as he put it, "liberal intellectuals, mostly Jewish people I have been associated with in the state for a long time, including the people who urged me to run." His early success in raising money from these committed people—over $200,000—forced Congressman Maguire out of the race. Leone then took a large chunk of this money, hired well-known media consultant, David Garth, and put on an early TV blitz to gain name recognition. In two weeks, he went from 14% to 33% in name recognition; and so doing he separated himself, once and for all, from Alex Menza. "Menza and I started with the same name recognition, the same background and we've gotten the same news coverage," said Leone, "but my recognition is now double his." Leone was without question a legitimate candidate, i.e., well qualified. "As Governor Byrnes' State Treasurer," editorialized the New York Times, "Mr. Leone was the architect of the state income tax, of the fiscal arrangements that led to the construction of the Meadowlands sports complex and of an innovative bond program that rescued the hard-pressed cities..." David Garth, not a man to take on loses, gave some testimony to Leone's electability by signing on as his consultant. So, Leone had credibility and he had first stage momentum.
He had workers, but he needed voters.

His second stage strategy envisioned reaching for broad support from the Democratic party organizations in the large cities of New Jersey—Newark, Camden, Jersey City—where political machines survive and machine-produced votes can carry primary elections. The key to this voter support was to be his long time friend and party leader, Governor Brendan Byrne—from whom Leone sought a public endorsement and private persuasion with organization Democrats. He got a public endorsement from Byrne. But that is all he got. Speaking of the Democratic bastion Jersey City, for example, Leone said, "If the Governor had gotten the Mayor in line as soon as he indicated he was wavering, I would have locked up the nomination right there. But he did nothing and the genie got out of the bottle." Byrne's unwillingness or inability to persuade organization Democrats was reflected in tepid, pro forma support from local leaders, and this, in turn, was a signal to campaign watchers that Leone's campaign had faltered. "By all the rules of politics," said a New York Times editorial, "it should have been over when Governor Byrne endorsed Mr. Leone...however, the endorsement failed to sew
up the nomination for (him)." Media assessments of flagging momentum in the search for voters cost him support in the continuing campaign for money.

In April, our campaign was on the verge of collapse. We were thinking we might even have to drop out of the race. We raised only three or four thousand dollars in the first two weeks of April. It was a disaster partly because of the treatment we were getting in the press. It was the press that kept saying we were in trouble.

They were in trouble, because Leone got bogged down in long negotiations with the reluctant organization Democrats, who became the tar baby of his campaign. But the media assessment was compounding his problem. "The last three weeks," he said later, "the media was playing it that Bradley was going to win big. That's an awfully hard thing to turn around--especially when you are out of money."

When I was there, Leone was searching desperately both for free media coverage and for money to buy paid-for media, buoyed by some poll results showing a fairly large undecided vote, but plagued by a downward spiral in
momentum. He toured a senior citizen center in Newark for which he, as State Treasurer, had raised the money. But it produced no interest inside or outside the center. "It was a waste of time," said Leone as we drove away, "we did it hoping some media people would come. Then it would have been a great media event. But it's a crapshoot. All the media people must have gone home...I should have spent time on the phones looking for money."

The next day he said, "We're broke. We had to stop a mailing today because we have no money—much less for TV. We had to go off the air today and we'll be off tomorrow and the next two days after that. If that ever gets out it will flatten us. If we can't raise about $20,000 more, we can't keep up the momentum." Well, he had lost the momentum and only a miracle could reverse the campaign rhythm. "Did you see the movie BATTLEGROUND," he asked whimsically? "We're waiting for the airdrop to come and the clouds to break. This is the Battle of the Bulge." Well, the clouds never broke and the airdrop never came. Ten days later Bill Bradley got 61% of the vote; Dick Leone got 27%.

It is not my purpose to explain why Dick Leone lost, only to describe, from
my vantage point, the internal rhythm of his campaign—the success of his first campaign, the failure of his second campaign. Similarly, we can describe the contrasting rhythm of Paul Tsongas' campaign—or campaigns.

Tsongas was a two term Congressman from Massachusetts, one of the Democratic Watergate babies of 1974; he was running for a seat in the U.S. Senate—against five primary opponents. His major primary opponent was Paul Guzzi, the elected Secretary of State of Massachusetts, a young carbon copy liberal reformer and friend of Tsongas. Guzzi was leading Tsongas by 25 points, 39-14, in the polls. Tsongas was running second in a field of five in the same polls when I first dropped in on him in Fall River in late July. The answer to "How's it going?" was, "Can't tell. My problem," he said that day, "is recognition. People don't know who I am or what my record is. That's why television will be so important to me." His basic strategy was to get known and, once known, to emphasize his congressional accomplishments, substantive and stylistic. None of his primary opponents had held national office. But one of the conventional commentators gave him much of a chance. On July 31, the Boston Globe's political analyst wrote that "Tsongas hopes to break through with his experience in
Washington... but the candidate best known, Mr. Guzzi, will be the one to beat, the early line shows." "The Globe didn't take me seriously," Tsongas said later. "They assumed Guzzi would win... In May, June, July and most of August we were wandering around in the wilderness. But the Globe wasn't alone. It was the conventional wisdom."

Paul Tsongas began with a hard-core of strong supporters from his congressional district; enough to give him some first stage credibility. And he was about to reach for a larger constituency of voters with a two week television blitz, when I dropped in. He hoped the blitz would generate some second stage credibility and some second stage momentum.

"The most important strategic decision," his pollster said,

was the decision to go on television early. It was in line with our decision to go for visibility and get on television before Guzzi. We knew he was having trouble raising money. But is is axiomatic that if you don't save money for the end, you don't win. So everybody saves something to use for TV at the end. We put all our chips on two weeks of early TV and gambled that the increase in visibility would produce enough momentum so that we would raise more money for the last couple of weeks.

"Sometimes," said a TV consultant, "You blow your whole wad and nothing
happens." That is exactly what did happen--nothing--in the case of Dick Leone. But Paul Tsongas' gamble paid off.

Three days after his TV blitz had ended in mid August, I dropped in again on the Tsongas campaign in Springfield. Now the answer to "How's it going?" was "Looking good." "When you were in Fall River," Tsongas recalled, "no one at the factory gates knew who I was. Now, after our TV ad has run for two weeks, the difference is phenomenal." "I'm getting nostalgia about the campaign," he added. His name recognition had jumped from 12% to 42%. From being 25 points behind in the preference polls, he was now only two points behind, 21-19, with a huge undecided vote. He had gotten the additional momentum he needed; and he used it to generate more. Speaking to his workers at the opening of his Springfield headquarters, he said, "I'm up from 14% and I'm taking support from Guzzi. The poll shows that my support is the most solid of any of the candidates. More are shifting into the undecideds." At a fund-raising luncheon in Springfield, he solicited second-stage money. He said,
Guzzi's coming backwards, and we're going forward and we're not far behind. The momentum is ours, and it's ours because we've spent $200,000. My opinion has been that if I could get known and get my record across we would win. You can't penetrate people with a record if they don't know who you are.

Now, he was saying, he expected a broader credibility. He expected to be taken seriously by Massachusetts Democrats outside his own 5th Congressional District. "The knock on me," he told the luncheon guests, "has always been 'good congressman would make a good senator, can't be elected, can't raise money, can't organize.' That's buried. The last nail in the coffin is these poll results." From this group and others, Tsongas raised $250,000 more between August 10th and primary day a month later.

The early TV campaign had been the turning point of the campaign. It had given him the momentum he needed. "Our August poll showed that everything we had projected was happening," his pollster said. "It was the time I stopped worrying about the race. I thought it was right on the track."

Sometime in late August, Tsongas edged ahead of Guzzi with the undecideds as large as ever. Late in the campaign, the Globe's political writer wrote that a characterization of Tsongas as "the heavyweight" and Guzzi as the
"lightweight" had become "the centerpiece of the campaign." That media assessment, too, indicated the campaign was "right on the track." On September 12, Tsongas got 35% of the vote; Guzzi got 31%.

Whereas Dick Leone's primary campaign graph slopes sharply upward and then steadily down, Tsongas' primary campaign graph slopes continuously and uninterruptedly upward. Indeed, the upward slope continued right through the general election in which he won a seat in the Senate. As his pollster said, "Our campaign ran in a straight line, from May 17 to November 2."

His general election opponent, incumbent Senator Edward Brooke, was vulnerable, Tsongas believed, because of lack of accessibility at home and his lack of effectiveness in the Senate. "Ed Brooke has to answer two questions," Tsongas would say. "What has he done? and, When was the last time you saw him? His problems are performance and accessibility." These vulnerabilities were compounded by Brooke's financial difficulties—although Tsongas, much to his advantage, entered the race before these difficulties became known. In his campaign against Brooke, Tsongas was
helped by the free media as well as the paid-for media. "Brooke is the best, most polished debater, (they said) you'll look like a kid...but there I was holding my own against a 12-year incumbent. Everyone agreed that because of accessibility and because of his troubles, people would choose me so long as they wouldn't have to pay a price. The debates eliminated that concern."

On November 7, Tsongas got 55% of the vote; Brooke got 45%. Whereas Dick Leone's campaign graph slopes upward and then down, Tsongas' line shows a long, continued uninterrupted upward spiral. As his pollster said, "Our campaign ran in a straight line, from May 17 to November 2." Summing up his six month campaign rhythm, Tsongas said later, "It was perfect. We didn't make one mistake. It was incredible." So far as I could tell, he was right.

In describing the Leone and Tsongas campaign rhythms, I have given special prominence to the influence of the mass media. I have emphasized it for two reasons. First, Leone and Tsongas themselves emphasized it. Both
candidates believed that their campaign rhythms would be crucially affected by the mass media—over which they could exercise only limited control. Candidate control over the paid-for media depends, of course, on money. Both Leone and Tsongas were able to establish sufficient early credibility to raise enough money to pay for a TV blitz that gave them first stage, lift off momentum. Each effectively turned a multi-candidate primary contest into a two candidate primary contest. During this first stage of the campaign, candidate success depends heavily on the assessments of others concerning his credibility. But these "others" are a relatively small group, his oldest supporters, his natural constituency—Leone's liberal intellectuals, Tsongas' fifth District constituents.

When the candidate reaches out for broader voter support, his success depends once again on the assessment of others concerning his credibility. But now he must reach well beyond his natural constituency to other elites whose assessments of his credibility are necessary to his continued credibility. The candidate must convince these more distant elites of both his credibility and his momentum. Here is where candidate polls can have a
bootstrap effect on campaigns. Here, too, is where the mass media may have an effect. I speak now particularly of the free media, which is more the product of intrinsic media interest than of the candidates' money. For the media become crucially important arbiters of credibility and momentum. They affect the credibility of candidates by the seriousness with which they take them. The Boston Globe described Tsongas as "the heavyweight" in his primary contest with Paul Guzzi; the New York/New Jersey media was unwilling to describe Dick Leone that way—though he clearly qualified as the "heavyweight" in his race against Bill Bradley. Similarly, the media affects campaign momentum when they assess the ebb and flow of a campaign— as, for example, they assessed and thus accelerated the ebb of the Leone campaign. Candidates work hard soliciting media coverage and up-beat media commentary on their chances. But their control, as we have emphasized, is limited. Some candidates, of course, come with potent natural advantages in this respect. Bill Bradley, the New York Knicks basketball star, was delivered into politics by the media and he remained the favorite subject of his media midwives throughout the campaign—his celebrity status unmatched and untouched by Dick Leone.
I have paid special attention to the media, for a second reason, because in comparing the 18 House campaigns I had watched earlier with the seven Senate campaigns, the single most striking difference was the greater importance of the media—both paid-for media and free media—in the Senate campaigns. It is an observation amply confirmed in recent political science research.

In Michigan's 1978 national voter survey, it was discovered that the challengers to Senate incumbents are much more widely recognized and much more favorably evaluated than are the challengers to House incumbents. Furthermore, it was discovered that the main vehicle for contact between Senate challengers and voters was television and that the number of voters who had seen the Senate challenger on TV was twice the number who had seen House challengers. In sum, Senate races were far more competitive than House races; and the major factor was the difference in media coverage—particularly television. As the Leone and Tsongas campaigns demonstrate, Senate challengers can and do raise a lot of money for paid media—more we
would guess than most House challengers. They draw from larger state-wide constituencies than House members and also from out of state constituencies. And Senate challengers can generate a good deal of free media, too,--more, we would also guess than House challengers. Once he became the official Democratic challenger to Senator Edward Brooke, Paul Tsongas said, "I wasn't an unknown anymore. I spent half of my days with reporters in the car—local, state and national." The media, for their own reasons, find Senate campaigns more to their liking than House campaigns. That is because the media find Senators more to their liking than House members. A body in which a sizable proportion of its members are incubating presidential and vice presidential candidates is more attractive than one whose members seldom pursue such lofty ambitions. A body of 100 is easier to cover and easier to portray than a body of 435. State interests are easier to grasp and command a wider reading or viewing audience than district interests. The media gives prominence to senators; and the media covers senators because they are prominent. Senators benefit from this self-fulfilling attentiveness spiral. But, and this is my point, so do Senate challengers.
One-third of the Senate incumbents who ran for reelection in 1976 and in 1978 were defeated. The comparable figure for House incumbents is only five percent. In the opinion of pollster Pat Cadell, "Recent elections show that it is more difficult to hold onto a Senate seat than any other office." And political scientist, Barbara Hinckley, writes that while the story of the House may be one of "the vanishing marginals," the story of the Senate maybe that of "the vanishing incumbents." The difference may be explainable, largely in terms of the differential effects of the mass media on House and Senate campaigns. Just how this special media attentiveness to Senate campaigns relates to the activities of senators once they are in office remains to be examined. But, since the relationship is rooted in mutual needs and attractions, we would expect it to continue—and to be as important to politics inside the Senate as it is to politics outside the Senate.

Important as the media is to Senate campaign strategies, its importance is not uniform across all races. Congressman Paul Tsongas' campaign for a
Massachusetts Senate seat was essentially a media campaign. In neighboring
Maine, however, Congressman Bill Cohen's campaign for the Senate against
incumbent William Hathaway was far less dependent on the media. Cohen
conducted a more typical, more personal House campaign onto which he
grafted media in amounts designed to match--dollar for dollar--his
opponent's media spending. When I dropped in on his campaign, the answer
to "How's it going?" was, "Right now I'm in good shape. If the election
were held today, I would win. So if I raise enough money to stay even with
Hathaway on television, I should be all right."

Cohen was campaigning exactly the way he had in every House campaign since
the first one in 1972. He was gaining exposure by walking his
constituency--only this time he was walking his new territory. He walked
27 miles in three days (I walked 20 and rode 7). "I'm doing the same thing
I've always done," said Cohen. During my second visit to Maine, he was
doing something else he had always done. A Republican, he was running
aggressively in the Democratic heartland of his constituency. In his House
constituency, this had meant the French-Canadian areas; now it meant the
Irish-Italian wards of Portland—in a neighborhood called Monjoy Hill.

We have opened our headquarters on Monjoy Hill, he told people. That's just what I did when I began in 1972. People said, don't go to Lewiston; don't go up in the St. John Valley. Those are Democratic strongholds and you can't crack them. It's no use. Well, true to my nature, I headed straight for those two places.

In the Senate campaign, he headed straight for Monjoy Hill using the same person-to-person campaign style he had previously used to capture majorities in Democratic Lewiston and the St. John Valley.

I started a little cultivation last year when I went in and played baseball with some of the kids. That caused a little stir and broke the ice. Then I got Jim Ward who knows everybody and he got Matt Tucci. Diane and I went to stay in the Tucci's home one night. Later, they invited 15 or 20 people in to meet me and they talked to others. So, you work out in circles, getting to know people. People came because Ida and Matt said they liked me. (Basically, it boils down to the fact that you are paying attention to them. That's what counts, not party or issues...) I've done this ever since my first campaign—stayed in people's homes, picked almost at random. They might be embarrassed and say the bed was too small. I would say, 'I don't care what you have. I'll sleep in a chair. When you stay with someone, you have made a friend for life. Ida and Matt are on the street, going from house-to-house for me.'

Cohen's Senate campaign could bear a strong resemblance to his House campaign because his Senate constituency bore such a strong resemblance to
his House constituency. Maine has only two congressional districts and Cohen had already represented one of them for six years. He had a proportionately large base of support to reach from; and he had only one congressional district--500,000 people--to reach. Furthermore, the notoriety he had gained as a member of the House Judiciary Committee during the widely televised Nixon impeachment hearings had given him a head start. When I first saw Cohen, he was shaking hands with the early morning shift at the Naval Shipyard in Kittery--in the farther-most corner of his new territory. Afterward, at breakfast, he remarked, "My name recognition is nearly as great in this district as it is in my own."

That same week I got my first look at Paul Tsongas. He, too, was shaking hands in the early morning at the gates of three textile factories in Fall River. Getting in the car to go to breakfast, I asked him, "Did anyone recognize you?" "No," he said, "why should they?" Like Cohen, Tsongas already represented one congressional district in his state. But it was one of 12, not one of two. Tsongas' new constituency contained 11 more congressional districts and five-and-one-half million more people. "I like
shaking hands at factory gates," he said later, "there's something about pressing the flesh...but when you shake hands with 400 people out of six million, you don't make much of an impact." Hence, his major strategic reliance on television in his primary campaign. It was a medium he had never used before.

My previous observations of House member campaigns had left me with a generalization that highlights a conservatism in adopting campaign strategy. It is that, all other things being equal, previously successful candidates will campaign the same way they did in their previous campaign. They will do "this time" whatever it was that they did with success "last time." Observing Senate campaigns produces this necessary corollary: that the more last times constituency is like this times constituency, the more likely are the two campaigns to be similar. Or, conversely, the greater the difference between last times constituency and this times constituency, the greater the difference between last times campaigning and this times. Taken together, these generalizations help explain why Bill Cohen's Senate campaign bore a much stronger resemblance to his House campaign than Paul
Tsongas' Senate campaign did to his House campaigns.

So, candidates tend to campaign the same way they did before—provided they are successful and provided they are running in the same constituency. Senate incumbents—unlike Senate challengers—were previously successful and they do run in the same constituency as before. So, we might predict that our incumbent senators would campaign in 1978 just like they had in their previous campaigns. But that campaign would have been in 1972 and the passage of six years might have rendered "all other things not equal at all." Nonetheless, incumbents may still adopt a conservative strategy, and campaign "just like we did it last time." And therein lies potential peril. Bill Cohen was running against one-term incumbent Senator Bill Hathaway. A Boston Globe reporter covering the Hathaway campaign found him in exactly that kind of peril—he was doing the same things he had done to unseat incumbent Margaret Chase Smith in 1972. And the reporter found people questioning that strategy. He wrote, "Some wonder if (Hathaway) isn't living in the past. This year he is visiting each of Maine's 495 cities and towns, but in many cases, he makes only one stop—at the general
store or gas station. He relies on those he sees there to spread the word.

It worked in 1972, but that was due in part to Mrs. Smith's refusal to campaign at all. In 1972, Hathaway was a phenomenon. In 1978, he is an incumbent..." What had been a winning campaign strategy in his last campaign just might have been inappropriate to the changed context six years later.

Bill Cohen's campaign theme echoed the Globe reporter's doubts. Cohen believed that Hathaway's views were not in tune with Maine. Cohen's television ads and his literature proclaimed his slogan: "Bill Cohen—he speaks for Maine." And, privately, he said, "Bill Hathaway's voting record is not in line with the thinking of Maine voters. He's a Harvard-educated liberal and he votes that way. But he hides that liberalism behind the down-to-earth, old shoe approach." Cohen's strategy was to affect Hathaway's down home appeal by campaigning person-to-person as he always had, while accenting and polarizing their policy differences whenever possible during his person-to-person encounters and in the media. "When that man came up to me last night and said, 'We're voting for you because..."
you'll do the same as Hathaway only better,' I said, "No, that's not why
you should vote for me. I'll do it differently. We are sharpening the
differences and hitting hard on the issues," he said. "Our TV and our
literature are hitting the Indian land issue, Dickey-Lincoln (power
project), the pay raise and the spending issue."

While Cohen portrayed Hathaway as out of tune and out of touch with Maine,
Hathaway obliged by campaigning against Cohen, the aggressive challenger,
just the way he had campaigned six years before against Smith, the aging
incumbent. It was a losing strategy in 1978—worth 37% of the two-party
vote on election day. The point is not just that a challenger's strategy
(which he was in 1972) may be unsuitable for an incumbent (which he was in
1978). The point is, also, that during a six-year term, the entire
campaign context may change.

Among the contextual factors, the issue climate—in Hathaway's case, the
rising conservatism of Maine—may be particularly likely to change. When
Dick Clark, another freshman "phenomenon" of 1972, talked about his 1978
defeat, he highlighted the considerable six-year change in Iowa.

When I went in, in 1972, the war was still on—Viet Nam. The fellow I ran against, Miller, was very closely associated with that. That was of interest to people. There was not that avalanche of anti-government feeling, in the sense that government could not solve problems. There as a suspicion of people in government, the sense that government was remote—that feeling was there. But the lack of faith in government has grown enormously in six years. In 1972, there was a lot more support for farm supports. There was more support for government programs to help me...Now there's the Goldwater spirit that government never has done anything right and never will...So the mood changed in six years. There's no doubt about it. The impact was very great, I think. People said, 'Dick Clark is not a bad guy. He works hard at it; he's honest; he comes back. But he's just too liberal. He hasn't kept up with this change and is hold out for old ideas. There's nothing wrong with him but his views.'

Like Hathaway, Clark may also have employed an inappropriate campaign strategy. I cannot say. But, as in the Hathaway case, Clark's campaign problem may have been the inappropriateness of the policy views with which he had to campaign. Whether it be the deficiencies of last times strategy or the deficiencies of last times positions, either or both can give us a measure of just how long a senator's six-year term can be.

To put it bluntly, six years can be a political lifetime. So, too, can be the two years of a House term. But not as likely. House members get
regular electoral feedback; senators do not. Bill Cohen had faced a Maine electorate twice in the interim between his first House race in 1972 and his Senate race in 1978. Bill Hathaway had not faced a Maine electorate at all during the same six-year interval. Dick Clark got no electoral feedback between 1972 and 1978. Six years provide plenty of time for conditions at home to change. And six years without electoral feedback is plenty of time for incumbent senators to grow out of touch with conditions at home.

A senator could, in theory, campaign continually for six years; but without the demands of an election every two years, the incentives for non-stop campaigning are absent. Moreover, the incentives to do something other than campaign for six years are present. House members who seek Senate seats—the Tsongases and Cohens—find the prospective freedom from continuous campaigning one of the most attractive features of the job. They want to do other things with their time. A six-year term is very different from a two-year term—in large part because a six-year electoral cycle is very different from a two-year electoral cycle.
Thus, our focus on Senate campaigning brings us to a view of the Senate that places special emphasis on the distinctive nature of its six-year electoral cycle. And a focus on the six-year cycle may give us a useful analytical handle on senatorial behavior and on House/Senate campaigns. It invites the analysis of behavior patterns over time, a kind of sequential analysis in which campaign activity and non-campaign activity rise and fall over the cycle to a degree that is not duplicated in the House. Senators, we assume, worry a lot about reelection. But, it is also reasonable to argue that their reelection concerns are less immediate, less constant and less overwhelming than are those of House members because of the six-year term. If that is so, it should be easier for outsiders like us to disentangle their campaign activities from their non-campaign activities. Such activities go on simultaneously in the House. But they go on sequentially in the Senate. "My usual pattern," says five-term senator Russell Long, "is in the first three years of a term to stick close to the job here and in the last three years to step up the pace in Louisiana."
One possible construct is to think of a senatorial cycle in which, in the manner of Russell Long, part of the six-year term is devoted primarily to non-campaign activity and another part is devoted primarily to campaign activity. A four-year concentration on one followed by a two-year concentration on the other seems plausible. I have examined the campaign contribution records of all senators for the year 1977. The 22 incumbent senators who ran for reelection in 1978 collected an average of $250,000 apiece—in 1977, the year before the election. They were busy campaigning. The 34 senators who would not be up for reelection until 1980, collected an average of $5,000. They showed little or no interest in fund-raising. Indeed, the median amount of money collected by this group—whose election was three years away—was zero! Finally, the 30 senators whose reelection was five years away, collected an average of $34,000. This group, I assume, was still—in 1977—paying off its campaign debts—looking backward to the election of 1976, not forward to the election of 1982. Fund-raising, surely one measure of campaign activity, varies markedly with the proximity to election. And these differences furnish some evidence of the cyclical nature of Senate behavior.
On this evidence, Senate campaign, by incumbents, begins in earnest during
the fifth year of their term. Therefore, by the time I dropped in on any
incumbent campaigns—in the fall of 1978—they were in a pretty advanced
stage of development. When I dropped in on freshman senator Pete
Domenici's campaign for reelection in New Mexico, for example, it was very
late in the game. "Eighteen months ago," said Domenici, "we started to
think about the strategy of the campaign. Our first strategy was to scare
off other people from running by showing strength. And we did many
interesting things to show our strength...it worked in scaring off the
governor and (a) congressman. It didn't work on my opponent. Whether or
not we scared off the right people, we'll know on November 7." One of the
"interesting things" Domenici had done in 1977 was to raise $300,000.

His press secretary discussed some others. "In June of 1977, we made a
major strategic decision—to put an aura of invincibility around Pete
Domenici. We collected a lot of money from all segments of the population
of the state. We brought Domenici and his family back to New Mexico. We
ran a spring primary campaign as if we had an opponent—a heavy schedule of personal campaigning and a heavy television campaign. In June of 1978 we took a poll. Domenici was ahead of his opponent by 24 points."

This pre-election year activity was probably the key to what turned out to be a close 52-47% win. "Here's something that would interest you from your professional standpoint," Domenici said afterward. "All the political leaders in the state on both sides thought my opponent was in a hopeless race. They believed the polls. The Democratic leaders believed that so much, they gave up on him. They didn't dig down and help him. That may have hurt him more than anything else. I've never said that to anyone before, but I believe it is true."

Given the apparent ability of most Senate challengers to capture media attention and to raise money once they win the nomination, it would seem that the most useful thing an incumbent senator could do with his money-raising and other incumbent-related abilities is to employ them in his fifth year to scare off strong potential challengers. Once his challenger
has entered the race, his incumbency advantages will have pretty well
dissipated. We know senators campaign heavily in their sixth year. But,
as the Domenici case indicates, the fifth year may be equally, if not more,
critical for campaigning. If that is true, then approximately one-third of
the Senate will be preoccupied with campaign activities at any one point in
time.

During the Constitutional Convention of 1787, James Wilson reflected on the
effects of staggered senatorial elections. "As one-third would go out
triennially," he said, "there would always be divisions holding their
places for unequal terms and consequently acting under the influence of
different views and different impulses." Among those different impulses--
in the 20th century anyway--is the impulse to campaign, which preoccupies
the one-third who are closest to reelection time. But, we might argue,
only that one-third. What views and impulses, then, stir the other two
classes--each at somewhat different points in the electoral cycle? One way
to go about answering that question is to watch the views and impulses of
people who are at the very beginning of the senatorial cycle--during their
first days and months as United States senators.