natural: the quadrivium
             relating to the body <  
Philosophy <                         reasonable: the trivium 

             relating to the soul    moral: the cardinal virtues 

           law: natural
Law  <     right: reasonable
                        written: constitution
           custom: < 
                        unwritten: usage

The author's meaning is clarified if reward is allowed the rare sense "estimation, worth" recorded by OED (under reward sb^I I 3) only in two texts from the fourteenth century, and the punctuation slightly modified.
   Wherfore euery wight, by reson of lawe, after his rightwysenesse apertely his mede may chalenge, and so thou that maynteynest lawe of kynde and therfore disease hast suffred in the lawe. Rewarde is worthy to be rewarded and ordayned, and apartly thy mede might thou chalenge.
   That is, everyone may claim his reward to the extent that he has earned it by virtue of his goodness; so may the Dreamer, who has maintained nature's laws and suffered for his pains. Moral worth deserves to be rewarded and clearly the Dreamer is justified in claiming what is due to him.

The Dreamer is here restating the law that the Lady has just enunciated: that by virtue of his goodness a man may claim the reward due to him . . .; that worth ought to be rewarded. . . . His restatement is: "Wel deseruynge in to worship of a wight without nedeful compulsion ought medefully to be rewarded." That is, merit in voluntarily doing honour to a person deserves to be rewarded. . . . Repunctuation helps to make the meaning clearer.
    Certes, quod I, this haue I wel lerned. And euer hensforward I shal drawe me therafter in onehed of wyl to abyde, this lawe bothe maynteyne and kepe (and so hope I best entre in to your grace): Wel deseruynge in to worship of a wight without nedeful compulsion ought medefully to be rewarded.

. . . Thynne's text is little more than bewildering nonsense. . . . Anselm's De concordia is not easy to understand in itself and Usk's version of it is often baffling unless read beside the original, and sometimes then as well. At line . . . [424] of this chapter the manuscript from which Thynne's text was set had the major displacement of leaves discussed in the Introduction . . .; consequently, any attempt by the printer to get a general sense of the chapter's argument was futile. In view of these circumstances, the corruption of Thynne's text is not surprising. . . . [T]he editor must acknowledge that his proposals are little more than first aid to what must be considered a locus desperatus.

The conclusion is, if it is not too absurd even to state, either it is not by necessity or it is not anything which God knows or foreknows to be or not to be. Therefore [= Usk and yet] nothing prevents anything from being known or foreknown by him in our wills or from being done in our acts, or from being in the future through free will. (p. 453; see Appendix 3)

God is said to have ordained for himself immutably what can be changed amongst men before it happens.

It seems to me that things coming or else past here in your temporal time ought not to be denied to be in eternity ever now and present. And yet it does not follow that anything which was or will be (in time) is not there [in eternity] in any manner, past or else future: we shall completely deny that, because there [in eternity] it is without ceasing in its manner of the present." (p. 464)

Usk's request . . . is for information on two problems: one concerns the problem of evil and the other concerns God's foreknowledge. Love replies by sending him in lines [569-73] back to II.13 and II.14 in the Testament, chapters that contain a discussion of the nature of evil; see, especially, II.13.1ff. . . . The reference to Tr can thus be seen as one to matters about foreknowledge.

Finally, imprisoned by the Lords Appellant, when his new political motive, the king's service, had become the reason why execution for treason was close upon him, he was driven to those profound considerations of value, vocation, commitment, and the analogy between human and divine love which are the intellectual glory of the Testament. The joins and inconsistencies in the book [viz., 3] are unrevised, presumably, because he suffered execution. (p. 237)

Because Usk does not define his terminology clearly, a brief summary of the argument may be helpful. As the body has instruments of use, such as eyes to see and feet to walk, so the soul has its instruments. One instrument of the soul is reason and another is will. Each instrument of the soul has use and also propensities, Anselm's aptitudines, which Usk renders as aptes. Anselm refers to the aptitudines voluntatis, the propensities of the will, by the word affectiones, which Usk renders as affections. Thus the will is an instrument of the soul and can be considered in three ways: it can be referred to simply as the will itself, or by its affections, or by its use.

"In every thyng, I woot, ther lith mesure.
For though a man forbede dronkenesse,
He naught forbet that every creature
Be drynkeles for alwey, as I gesse."

"Thenk here-ayeins: whan that the stordy ook,
On which men hakketh ofte, for the nones,
Receyved hath the happy fallying strook,
The greete sweigh doth it come al at ones.''

this passage is an account of why Usk withdrew his support from Northampton and appealed him for treason presented in terms of Anselm's discussion of free will, justice and grace. . . The point is clear enough in outline, if not in the veiled statement in the Testament. Usk presents his appeal of Northampton for treason as a return by means of grace received from the Margarite perle to the full freedom of his will, that is, of his capacity to leave off injustice and bestyal appetytes and chose [sic] justice. To explain this political shift of allegiance in terms of Anselm's theological philosophy is an unusual and remarkably sophisticated argument without parallel in Middle English literature.

A pamflet is a small treatise occupying fewer pages than would make a book. The word is, apparently, a generalized use of Pamphilet, a familiar name of a twelfth-century Latin amatory poem Pamphilus seu de amore. Usk's use is the first in English, and it may have a sense still connected with its source: "a short work about love."